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I. INTRODUCTION

The use of temporary foreign migrant workers in the labor
sector is part of a vibrant political and legal discussion in both the
United States and Canada. Current reforms of temporary foreign
worker programs in both countries call for an analysis of this
workforce. This article focuses on documented temporary foreign
workers performing agricultural labor in both countries. It is a
comparative study of alleged violations of documented temporary
foreign farm workers' rights relating to unionization in the
United States and Canada.
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This article does not focus on domestic migrant farm labor in
the respective countries or undocumented foreign workers,
although some areas of examined law touch on both groups. The
main focus of the comparative analysis in this article is to provide
insight into the broader situation of documented temporary
foreign farm workers in the United States and Canada. These
workers are part of the H-2A Visa Program in the United States
and the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) in
Canada. In order to compare the situations, the article first
provides an overview of Canadian and U.S. labor laws, including
laws relating specifically to the hiring of H-2A and SAWP
workers. It also provides a historical overview that is designed to
provide a basis for a comparative qualitative analysis of Canadian
labour and migration laws. Finally, there are case studies of
unionization efforts in both countries involving H-2A and SAWP
workers.
This article analyzes the responses to documented temporary
labor migration and unionization in both countries in order to
map out their differences and similarities. The analysis takes into
account the respective countries' relevant social and labor history
and legal systems. The comparison focuses specifically on
analyzing the differences and similarities in collective organizing
of H-2A and SAWP workers. It examines the responses generated
by alleged violations of law relating to collective bargaining in the
two countries. The "recent" history and responses in both
countries are defined in comparative terms as being after the end
of the Bracero Program in the United States in the 1950s, the
beginning of the U.S. H-2A Visa Program, and the creation of
Canada's SAWP in the 1960s.
The comparison illustrates that the legal situation of these
foreign farm workers in both countries does not represent an
exceptional situation. The historical and social context of farm
labor and the use of an unfree population are not limited to a
distinct North American farm history or racial attitudes towards
using foreign farm labor.1 The legal problems encountered in
1. See generally Jamie Morgan & Wendy Olsen, The Absence of Decent Work: The
Continued Development of Forced and Unfree Labour in India, 6 GLOB. LABOUR J. 173,
183 (2015) (discussing the comparison of unfree labour practices in India to such practices
in the United States and Mexico).
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applying collective bargaining principles to H-2A and SAWP
workers are related to the specific circumstances of the migration
itself: its temporary nature, the vulnerability of its subjects, and
its disproportionally unidirectional benefits to developed
societies.
There are specific reasons for selecting Canada and the
United States for a qualitative comparison and for the relatively
narrow focus of this article. In both Canada and the United
States, guest worker programs originated within their respective
agricultural sectors. 2 Although there is disagreement about
application of law to documented temporary foreign workers in
both countries, current migration scholarship reveals a near
consensus that both systems have generated legal responses that
are inadequate to the alleged violations of collective bargaining
rights. 3 Compared to Canada, the United States under the Trump
administration is witnessing a much broader debate over the
presence and conditions of migrant workers, both documented
and undocumented, within its territory. The workers' cause has
been taken up by a variety of NGOs and public interest lawyers,
greater international
and the United States has witnessed
4
advocates.
workers'
by
recourse

2. See S. POVERTY L. CTR., CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS
IN THE UNITED STATES 4 (2013), https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/fles/d6legacyfile

s/downloads/publication/SPLC-Close-to-Slavery-2013.pdf (describing how the H-2A
Program was created when the Florida sugar cane industry obtained permission to hire
Caribbean workers); W. Zachary Marshall, Seasonal Agricultural Workers in Canada:
Understanding the Socio-Political Issues 2 (Aug. 2015) (MA research paper, Western
University), https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=lOO3&context=sociology-ma
srp.
3. See Sarah H. Cleveland et al., Inter-American Court of Human Rights Amicus
CuriaeBrief- The United States Violates InternationalLaw When Labor Law Remedies Are
Restricted Based on Worker's Migrant Status, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 795, 814 (2003)
(discussing Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (making
remedies unavailable to unauthorized workers and employers likely to violate workers'
rights).
4.

See

Immigration

and

Refugee

Law,

PUB.

SERV.

LEGAL

CAREERS,

(last visited Jan. 6, 2019)
https://www.psjd.org/Immigration and-RefugeeLaw
(discussing how legal intervention in various practice areas, including public interest and
NGOs, is often required to ensure immigrant farm workers receive what they are entitled
to under the law).
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II. CANADIAN LABOUR LAW FRAMEWORK

Labour law in Canada falls under both federal and provincial
jurisdiction, with both the federal Parliament in Ottawa and
provincial legislatures able to enact labour legislation. 5 The
provinces have gained major jurisdiction due to various judicial
rulings that have limited federal labour jurisdiction to a relatively
small range of matters.6 Those labour matters under federal
jurisdiction fall under the Canada Labour Code, 7 while the
provinces typically have labour legislation designated as Labour
Relations or Industrial Relations Codes or Acts.8 The section of
the Canadian Constitution Act (1867) dealing with-"property and
civil rights" gives provinces a civil right over employment
contracts, which typically place restrictions between employers
and employees. Federal jurisdiction over some employment
matters arises out of S. 91 of the Constitution Act (1867), which
gives the federal Parliament legislative authority over federal
employees.
The Canada Labour Code is generally limited in its
application to workers in "works or undertakings connecting a
province with another province or country"9 : international
shipping, air transport, communications, banks, federal crown
corporations, and defined operations "declared by Parliament to
be for the general advantage of Canada or of two or more

5. See Constitution Act, 1867, c. 6, §§ 91-92 (UK).
6. See British Columbia Elec. Ry. Co. v. Canadian Nat'l Ry. Co., [1932] 1 S.C.R.161,
172 (Can.) (holding that the Board did not have jurisdiction); see Canadian Union of Pub.
Employees v. Labour Relations Board (N.S.) et al., [1983] 2 S.C.R. 311 (Can.) (narrowing
the power the Board has to conduct labour legislation in provinces); see also United
Transp. Union v. Cent. W. Ry. Corp., [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1112, 1115 (Can.) (distinguishing
that even though transportation of grain fell under federal jurisdiction, not all aspects of
the industry were controlled by federal jurisdiction).
7. Canada Labour Code, R.S.C. 1985, c L-2.
8. See George W. Adams, OVERVIEW OF LABOUR LAW IN CANADA 3 (2nd ed. 1995)
(explaining that labour relations are regulated by provinces, except if they are explicitly
allocated to federal jurisdiction).
9. Greg J. Bamber & Philippe Pochet, REGULATING EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS, WORK
AND LABOUR LAWS: INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS BETWEEN KEY COUNTRIES 40 (2010)

(listing examples of these works or undertakings include railways, bus operations,
trucking, pipelines, ferries, tunnels, bridges, canals, and telephone and cable systems).
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provinces." 10 Despite the federal jurisdiction over international
matters, including the subjects of naturalization and aliens, most
documented temporary foreign workers in Canada-including
SAWP workers-are deemed by the federal government to fall
under provincial jurisdiction.1 1
As of February 2017, all Canadian provinces, with the
exception of Ontario and Alberta, grant collective bargaining
12
rights to farm workers through provincial labour legislation.
Alberta has the most extensive prohibition, banning all
agricultural workers from engaging in any type of collective
bargaining activity. 13 Ontario was the scene of a protracted legal
battle beginning in the 1990s. A left-leaning NDP government
extended full collective bargaining rights to all legally employed
farm workers in the province in 1994,14 only to have the
legislation repealed by a right-leaning Progressive Conservative
government the following year. 15 The current legislation in
Ontario entails a modified structure of farm worker associations
but nevertheless excludes farm workers from taking advantage of
collective bargaining provisions available to most other workers
through provincial labour legislation. 16 Finally, it should be noted
that Canada has no federal legislation designed specifically
relating to employment standards, collective bargaining, and
documented foreign migrant workers in its territory. The

10. See id. (listing examples of operations deemed to be for the national advantage
of Canada including flour, feed and seed cleaning mills, feed warehouses, grain elevators,
and uranium mining and processing).
11. Understand Your Rights as a Foreign Worker, IMMIGR., REFUGEES &
CITIZENSHIP CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/services/

work-canadalpermit/temporary/after-apply-next- stepsunderstand-your-rights-foreignworkers.html (last modified Apr. 12, 2018).
12. See Christopher Albertyn, Labour Rights in Canada: Farm Workers and the
FraserCase, 17 CAN. LABOUR & EMI"T L.J. 493, 497-98 (2012) (book review).
13. See Alberta Labour Relations Code, c L-1 (noting that an employee may only
bargain through a bargaining agent).
14. Agricultural Labour Relations Act, S.O. 1994, c 6 (repealed 1995).
15. Labour Relations and Employment Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. 1995, c 1,
Sched. A; see Felice Martinello, Mr. Harris,Mr. Rae and Union Activity in Ontario, 26
ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES 17 (2000) (discussing how the Progressive Conservative
government led by Mike Harris passed legislation on November 10, 1995, that was less
favorable toward organized labour).
16. Agricultural Employees Protection Act, S.O. 2002, c 16; Labour Relations and
Employment Statute Law Amendment Act, S.O. 1995, c 1, Sched. A.
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Canadian government refers all questions regarding SAWP
workers and employment standards to separate provincial
17
departments.
III. AMERICAN LABOR LAW FRAMEWORK
Labor law in the United States consists of numerous state and
federal laws. Unlike Canada, American federal law has general
jurisdiction over workers' rights to collective bargaining, but
there are exceptions to this rule. 18 The source of federal legislative
primacy in the United States arises from the Supremacy Clause
of the U.S. Constitution. 19 The basis for federal jurisdiction
specifically relating to labor law originates from the Commerce
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. 20 This clause allows the U.S.
Congress to enact legislation regulating commerce between
American states. 21 Federal labor law legislation is predicated on
the theory that the federal regulation of labor-management
relations is "necessary to diminish industrial strife that should
disrupt interstate commerce. ' 22 From the Supremacy and
Commerce Clauses, U.S. courts have created a "doctrine of
preemption" and the notion that certain federal legislation is
intended to deprive U.S. states of jurisdiction in many labor law
23
matters.
Current federal U.S. labor law is largely a product of New
Deal labor reforms signed into law during the 1930s. Arguably
the most important legislation to emerge from President

17.

Temporary Foreign Workers: Your Rights Are Protected, EMP. & Soc. DEV.

CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/foreign-

workers/protected-rights.html (last modified May 17, 2018).
18. William B. Gould 1V, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 28 (MIT Press 3d ed.
1993).
19. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ('The Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land... and the Judges in every State shall
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.").

20. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
21. Id.
22. Gould IV, supra note 18, at 28.
23. See id. at 32 (explaining that U.S. courts have referred to this deprivation of
state jurisdiction in certain matters as Congress intending to "occupy the field" and avoid
conflicting interpretations of a law by state courts that may frustrate the objective of
federal legislation).
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Roosevelt's package of labor reforms was the National Labor
Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), popularly known as the Wagner
Act. 2 4 The Wagner Act provided basic workers' rights in union
organizing and collective bargaining, while prohibiting certain
employer and union conduct that could make employment
conditional on refraining from joining a union or mandatory union
25
membership.
The NLRA does not apply to H-2A workers in the United
States or to any agricultural workers. Some arguments similar
to those seen in the Canadian context for excluding farm workers
from unionization appear in U.S. labor history. 26 Apart from the
NLRA, American labor laws have also generally excluded large
groups of workers from coverage. 27 More specifically, the
exclusion of agricultural workers from the NLRA had no "logical
basis" other than the fact that they had 'little political clout when
the legislation was enacted."28 Interestingly, both the 1933
National Industry Recovery Act 29 (declared unconstitutional by

24. See Wagner Act, ROOSEVELT INST. (June 20, 2012), http://rooseveltinstitute.org/
wagner-act] (explaining that the Wagner Act, also known as the National Labor Relations
Act, was passed in 1935 and is arguably the most important piece of legislation protecting
workers' and unions' rights).
25. See id. (explaining that the Wagner Act included collective bargaining as a key
principle and prohibited coercing employees against their rights, interfering with the
formation of a labor organization, discriminating against employees to encourage or
discourage forming a union, discriminating against employees who file charges or testify,
and refusing to bargain collectively with the employees' representative).
26. See Brian Grijalva, Pacific Northwest Civil Rights and Labor History:
Communism in Washington State, Chapter 4 Organizing Unions: The 30's and 40's, U.
WASH., http://depts.washington.edu/labhist/cpprojectIgrijalva.shtml (last visited Jan. 23,
2019) (demonstrating that some of these arguments include the ever-present threat of
communism expanding in the Northwest).
27. See Derek C. Bok, Reflections on the Distinctive Character of American Labor
Laws, 84 HARv. L. REV. 1394, 1418 (1971) .(explaining that the National Labor Relations
Act and other labor relations laws are narrow in coverage, leaving much of the labor force
without coverage); see, e.g., Cal-Maine Labor Farms, 307 N.L.R.B. 450, 452 (1992) (holding
that employees were not exempt from coverage because Respondent failed to show that
the employees did not regularly handle the eggs of outside producers after the certification
date); DeCoster Egg Farms, 223 N.L.R.B. 884, 886 (1976) (holding that the processing
plant employees and the straight truck and trailer drive employees did not fall within the
agricultural exemption); Camsco Produce Co., 297 N.L.R.B. 905, 912 (1990) (holding that
the Glen Farm fresh pack department employees were agricultural workers exempt from
the Act's coverage).
28. Gould IV, supranote 18, at 35.
29. National Industrial Recovery Act, Pub. L. 73-67, 48 Stat. 195.
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the U.S. Supreme Court)30 and the initial version of the Wagner
Act in 1934 had no statutory exclusions of agricultural workers
under their respective collective bargaining provisions. 3 1
Legislative hearings on the Wagner Act, conducted in 1934 in the
House of Representatives and the Senate, "hardly discussed"
farm workers. 32 When Senator Wagner reintroduced the
legislation in 1935, the Senate report on the bill indicated that
agricultural laborers had been excluded for "administrative
reasons."3 3 An attempt in 1935 to include farm workers under the
Wagner Act was defeated by congressional opponents, who
expressed concerns over unionization's effects on American family
farms.

34

Although the NLRA does not cover any farm workers, several
states have passed labor laws that offer protections to
agricultural workers, including some collective bargaining
provisions. New Jersey and Missouri have constitutional
provisions that do not exclude farm workers from collective
bargaining but currently have no implementing legislation;
moreover, in any event, it is unclear if H-2A workers would be

30. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
31. See Austin P. Morris, Agricultural Workers and National Labor Legislation, 54
CALIF. L. REV. 1939, 1947, 1951-52 (1966) (demonstrating that the NIRA certainly had no
statutory exclusions under its collective bargaining provisions because the agricultural
workers had no rights under NIRA whatsoever, and the Wagner Act originally applied to
farm workers but was later changed to exclude them).
32. See Arthur N. Read, Let the Flowers Bloom and Protect the Workers Too, 6 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 525, 559, 559 n.124 (2004) (explaining that some testimony apparently
mentioned the need for farm worker protections under the Wagner Act and there was also
some concern expressed over the ability of small family farm owners to continue
functioning within the confines of the Wagner Act).
33. Morris, supra note 31, at 1953.
34. See 79 CONG. REC. 9668, 9721 (June 19, 1935) (recognizing that Congress' debate
included the term "agricultural laborer," but opponents to agricultural laborer
unionization prevailed and hence the term was not included in the bill).
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35

protected.
California has inclusive laws specifically aimed at regulating
agricultural workers' right to collective bargaining. 36 California
has long protected and regulated the unionization of farm
workers within the state through its Agriculture Labor Relations
Act (ALRA):
It is hereby stated to be the policy of the State of
California to encourage and protect the right of
agricultural employees to full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of
their own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions
of their employment, and to be free from the interference,
restraint, or coercion of employers of labor, or their
agents, in the designation of such representatives or in
self-organization or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or
protection. For this purpose this part is adopted to
provide for 7collective-bargaining rights for agricultural
3
employees.
There currently appears to be some uncertainty as to whether H2A workers would fall under the ALRA's jurisdiction although the
ALRA's administrative body, the Agricultural Labor Relations
Board, has heard complaints relating to the workplace conditions

35. See N.J. CONST. art. I, § 19 (providing to persons in private employment the right
to organize and bargain collectively, but failing to include implementation instruction or
define whether persons in "private employment" include H-2A workers); Mo. CONST. art.
I, § 29 (providing the right to organize and bargain collectively, but failing to include
implementation instruction or define whether persons in "private employment" include H2A workers); see generally Richard A. Goldberg & Robert F. Williams, Farmworkers'
Collective Organization and Bargaining Rights in New Jersey: Implementing SelfExecuting State Constitutional Rights, 18 RUTGERS L.J. 729, 731-32 (1987) (explaining
that the provisions in the New Jersey and Missouri Constitutions must be interpreted as
protecting the organizational and bargaining activities of farm worker unions).
36. See California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, CAL. LAB. CODE § 1140.2 (2012)
(explaining that agricultural employees have the right to self-organize; to form, join, or
assist labor organizations; to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing; and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection).
37. Id. §§ 1140.2, 1140.2.36.
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of H-2A workers. 38
Wisconsin, Washington, Oregon, and Pennsylvania have had
judicial rulings confirming some protected workplace rights for
agricultural workers; however, yet again, no collective bargaining
rights are offered to H-2A workers. 39 This modified protection
regime seems to mirror Ontario's approach to SAWP workers
with its AEPA that was confirmed by the Supreme Court of
Canada in the Ontario v. Frasercase. 40 Significantly, twenty-two
U.S. states- including most Southern states and many Plains
and Western states that have a large proportion of seasonal
migrant farm workers-have enacted "right-to-work" laws that
limit the ability of unions to expand outreach programs to H-2A

38. See Cal. Agric. Lab. Rel. Bd., Public Hearing to Receive Comment on
Worksite Access, Salinas Sports Complex (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.alrb.ca.gov/wp-co
ntent/uploads/sites/196/2018/06/2015-09-14_Salinas PulbicHearing.pdf
(highlighting
testimony to an Agricultural Labor Relations Board hearing in Salinas, California, which
included complaints relating to workplace conditions for H-2A workers and evidencing the
fact that there was some uncertainty in the hearing over whether those workers would fall
under the jurisdiction of the ALRA's Agricultural Labor Relations Board).
39. See OR. REV. STAT. § 662.010 (explaining that employees not working for a
definite term have a right to join a labor union, but failing to mention H-2A workers
specifically); 43 PA. STAT. ANN. §§ 211, 211.3 (2018) (illustrating an example of a judicial
ruling that upheld the right of laborers to organize); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 103.51-62 (2018)
(explaining that individual workers have full freedom of association, self-organization, and
the designation of representatives of the worker's own choosing, but failing to mention H2A workers specifically); see also Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 888 P.2d 147, 148 (Wash. 1995)
(holding that the Washington State Labor Act and state public policy gives farm workers
the right to strike and engage in other organized activities relating to working conditions,
without employer retaliation) and Garza v. Patnode, No. 25255, 1971 WL 14853, at *5
(May 5, 1971) (holding that Washington state protections extend to farm workers, but
failing to mention H-2A workers specifically); but see Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v.
San Point Country Club, 519 P.2d 985, 988-89 (Wash. 1974) (holding that there was no
employer duty to bargain in Washington state).
40. See Ontario v. Fraser, [2011] 2 S.C.R. 3, 6-7 (examining the extent to which
collective bargaining rights are covered by Canada's constitutional guarantee of freedom
of association). The Canadian Supreme Court rejected the argument that the government
is constitutionally required to take an active role in promoting and fostering collective
bargaining; instead, the right to freedom of association is limited to protecting the
associational activity itself, not a particular process (e.g., a particular model of collective
bargaining)). Id.

2018]

UNIONIZING TEMPORARY FOREIGNFARM WORKERS

15

41

workers.
There are other significant federal labor laws that apply to
farm workers in the United States but not necessarily to H-2A
workers. The Migrant and Seasonal Worker Protection Act
(MSPA) was adopted in 1983.42 The MSPA offers extensive
workplace protections to American and permanent resident
agricultural workers but specifically exempts H-2A workers from
its protections, excluding them from its definitions of both
''seasonal agricultural worker" and "migrant agricultural
worker." 43 The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) is federal
legislation in the United States. 44 Unlike the MSPA, some
provisions of the FLSA do apply to H-2A workers, although there
are exemptions with respect to farm workers related to minimum
wage on smaller farms and overtime pay. 45 The H-2A Program
itself requires compliance with FLSA minimum wages and
federal workers' deductions to ensure that migrant workers are
not paid below the federal minimum wage. 46 States are free to set
their own minimum wage laws, and in case of any conflict
between state and federal wage laws, the higher rate would

41. Gould IV, supra note 18, at 48 (explaining that states may prohibit the
negotiation of any such union security agreements, and twenty-one states have enacted
"right-to-work" legislation accomplishing this objective); e.g., Dane M. Partridge,
Virginia's New Ban on Public Employee Bargaining:A Case Study of Unions, Business,
and Political Competition, 10 EMP. RESP. & RTS. J. 127, 130-32 (1997) (showing that
Virginia is one such example of a Southern state with right-to-work laws); see also Tim
Carney, Opinion, A Strong Argument in Favor of Right-to-Work (FeaturingF.A. Hayek),
WASH. EXAM'R (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/a-strong-argumentin-favor-of-right-to-work-featuring-fa-hayek (explaining that right-to-work laws allow
workers in unionized shops to opt out of both union membership and dues).
42. 29 U.S.C. § 1801 (1983).
43. Id. §§ 1802(8)(B)-(10)(B)(iii) (stating that the MPSA's definition of "migrant
agricultural worker" or "seasonal agricultural worker" does not include "any temporary
nonimmigrant alien who is authorized to work in agricultural employment in the United
States under sections 101(a)(15)(H)(ii)3 and 214(c) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act.").
44. See id. § 1801 (defining "agricultural worker" as including the "harvesting of
horticultural commodities").
45. eLaws - Employment Law Guide, Wages and Hours Worked: Minimum
Wage and Overtime Pay, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, http://webapps.dol.gov/elaws/elg/minwage
.htm#who (last updated Dec. 2016).
46. Laurel E. Fletcher et al., Hidden Slaves: Forced Labor in the United States, 23
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 47, 63 (2005) (discussing how the federal minimum wage in the
United States has been $7.25/hour since July 24, 2009).
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apply. 47 The FLSA operates independently from the H-2A
Program. 48 American officials have admitted to some confusion in
interpreting the law and difficulties in enforcing certain aspects
of the FLSA, particularly with regard to H-2A workers-mainly
attributing these obstacles to a lack of available resources and
funding from the federal government. 49 Recent FLSA/H-2A
violations include litigation in which eighty-eight H-2A workers
from Thailand successfully sued their employer, Global Horizons,
for $153,000 in back pay and $194,000 in civil money penalties in
5°
connection with significant violations of the H-2A Program.
IV. CANADA'S SEASONAL AGRICULTURAL WORKERS PROGRAM

(SAWP)
The SAWP was established in 1966 as the first temporary
foreign worker program in Canada. 51 It initially brought workers
from former British colonies in the Caribbean to work temporarily
on Canadian farms. 5 2 Jamaica became the first country to send
migrant workers under the SAWP in 1966, starting with 264

47. See Labor Certification Process for the Temporary Employment of Aliens in
Agriculture in the United States: 2018 Adverse Effect Wage Rates for Non-Range
Occupations, 82 Fed. Reg. 60628 (Dec. 21, 2017) (describing how certain States with large
migrant farm worker populations, notably California, Florida, Illinois, and Washington,
have minimum wage laws higher than the federal rate; interestingly, the five states that
have no minimum wage laws are all located in the Southern United States).
48.

See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,

WAGE & HOUR Div., FACT SHEET # 26: H-2A

OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.dol.gov/whdlreg
s/compliance/whdfs26.pdf (discussing how the H-2A Program provides for reimbursement
of costs incurred for inbound transportation and subsistence not previously advanced or
otherwise provided to a worker once the worker completes fifty percent of the work
contract period; addressing the FLSA prohibition on migrant farm employees from
incurring costs that are primarily for the benefit of the employer, if such costs take the
employee's wages below the FLSA minimum wage; and stating that upon completion of
the work contract, the employer must either provide or pay for the covered worker's return
transportation and daily subsistence).
49. Temporary Employment of H-2A Aliens in the United States, 74 Fed. Reg. 25971
(May 29, 2009).
50. AgriCon Int'l Risk Mgmt. Inst., Federal Laws that Impact Agricultural
Employment and Seasonal Labor (IRMI Agribusiness Conf., 2017), https://www.irmi.com
/docs/default-source/afis-handouts/federal-laws-that-impact-agricultura-employmentand-seasonal-labor.pdf?sfvrsn=6>.
51. Marshall, supra note 2.
52. See id. (stating how SAWP has expanded to include Commonwealth Caribbean
countries).
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men. 53 Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados followed in 1967,
Mexico joined in 1974, and the Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States 54 joined in 1976. 55 Only workers from these
countries may participate in the SAWP. The Program grew to
include over 26,000 workers in 2009.56 The increased trade and
labour cooperation under the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) led Mexico to supply the majority of SAWP
with BC employing a growing
workers coming to Canada,
57
workers.
those
of
percentage
The SAWP is administered by Human Resources and Skills
Development Canada (HRSDC) and Service Canada (SC),
although Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) is also
involved in aspects of the Program. 58 The Government describes
the Program as matching "workers from Mexico and the
Caribbean countries with Canadian farmers who need temporary
support during planting and harvesting seasons, when qualified

53. Id.
54. See Member States, ORG. E. CARIBBEAN STATES, /https://www.oecs.org[home
page/member-states (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (listing OECS full membership: Antigua
and Barbuda; Commonwealth of Dominica; Grenada; Montserrat; St. Kitts-Nevis; Saint
Lucia; St. Vincent; and the Grenadines).
55. Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program, GLOB. WORKERS JUST. ALL.
http://www. globalworkers.org/country-data-countries/canada/seasonal-agriculturalworker-program (last visited Jan. 23, 2019).
56. See Philip L. Martin, MIGRANT WORKERS IN COMMERCIAL AGRICULTURE 16, fig.2,
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed protect/---protrav/--(2016),
ILO
migrantidocuments/publication/wcms_538710.pdf (depicting a graph demonstrating the
number of workers in 2009).
57. See Ofelia Becerril Quintana, A New Era of Seasonal Mexican Migration to
6
Canada,FOCAL: FOCALPOINT, https://www.focal.ca/publications/focalpoint/4 7-june2011-ofelia-becerril-quintana-en (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (explaining that after joining
the SAWP in 2004, BC saw the number of its SAWP workers increase from 1,484 in 2006
to more than 3,768 in 2008); see Peter H. Sawchuk, Guest Worker Programs and Canada:
Towards a Foundation for Understanding the Complex Pedagogies of Transnational
Labour, 20 J. WORKPLACE LEARNING 492 (2008) (discussing the effects of NAFTA on
Mexican temporary labour migration to Canada); see also Lance A. Compa, NAFTA's
Labour Side Agreement and International Labour Solidarity, 33 ANTIPODE 451 (2001)
(discussing the effects of the North American Agreement on Labour Cooperation (the
labour side-agreement to the NAFTA) on migration of Mexican farm workers).
58. See Irma Fabiola Cruz-Lopez, Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program: Looking
at Mexican Participation Through a Magnifying Glass 45, 59, 70 (2013)
(unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Ottawa), http://www.migrantworkersrights.net/
en/resources/the- seasonal- agricultural-workers-program-looking- a?display=print
(describing how SAWP is governed via SC, HRSDC, and CIC).
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Canadians or permanent residents are not available." 59 Only
farms that produce "primary agriculture commodity sector
products" may utilize SAWP workers. 60 As of July 2011, farms in
most Canadian jurisdictions are eligible. 6 1 The SAWP currently
operates within the framework of the Temporary Foreign Worker
Program (TFWP), which includes a range of occupations allowing
for various lengths of employment in Canada and even for
62
eventual residency for some occupations.
The process of hiring SAWP workers begins with an employer
completing a Labour Market Opinion (LMO) Form. 63 The LMO
form contains basic employer and employee information,
including whether the employee request is for a direct arrival or
transfer, the number of employees at the farm, and the types of
agricultural commodities produced along with methods of

59. Guest Worker Programs:Canada,LIBRARY OF CONG., https://www.loc.gov/law/
help/guestworker/canada.php (last updated July 30, 2015).
60. See id. (explaining that employers must meet three criteria to employ SAWP
workers, including that the "production" of goods must be in "specific commodity sectors"
and that SAWP workers "must work on the farm in primary agriculture").
61. See Labour Market Opinion (LMO) Statistics - Annual Statistics 2012,
EMP. & Soc. DEV. CAN., http://s3.amazonaws.com/migrants-heroku-production/datas/12
15/(LMO)_Statistics
HRSDC-original.pdf?1384392810 (last modified Oct. 28, 2013)
(noting the statistics of the provinces participating in SAWP as of July 2011, including:
British Columbia, Alberta, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Ontario, Quebec, New Brunswick,
Nova Scotia, and Prince Edward Island; and showing that Newfoundland, Yukon,
Northwest Territories, and Nunavut did not participate in the SAWP).
62. See Delphine Nakache, The Canadian Temporary Foreign Worker Program:
Regulations, Practices,and Protection Gaps 16, 19, http://www.yorku.ca/rapsl/events/pdf
/D Nakache.pdf (discussing other categories of workers including exotic dancers, certain
non-agricultural "low-skilled" occupations (i.e., clerical, retail, health, manufacturing,
etc.), and live-caregivers who have the possibility of being granted eventual residency in
Canada after a period of time of employment; and noting how SAWP operates within the
larger framework of the Temporary Foreign Worker Program: there are four "streams"
under which foreign seasonal agricultural workers may now apply, including (1) the
SAWP, "low-skilled" agricultural workers coming to Canada from non-SAWP countries,
(2) "high-skilled" agricultural workers (including apiary technicians and farm managers),
and (3) a "low-skilled" pilot project for foreign seasonal workers in certain mostly nonprimary agricultural commodities).
63. See Hire a Temporary Worker Through the Seasonal Agricultural Worker
Program - Apply for a Labour Market Impact Assessment, HUMAN RES. & SKILMS DEV.
CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/employment-social-development/services/foreignworkers/agricultural/seasonal-agricultural/apply.html
(last modified Oct. 31, 2018)
(explaining how to apply for a Labour Impact Assessment).
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production. 64 The form allows the employer to request a specific
worker or workers (the so-called naming of a worker) along with
requesting any unnamed workers. The job offer information must
indicate duties of the position, whether the position requires an
English or French-speaking worker, and the6 5 requested arrival
and anticipated departure date from Canada.
One of the basic purposes of the LMO form is to show that the
employer has made efforts to "recruit and/or train willing and
available Canadian citizens and permanent residents" for the
position(s).6 6 To that end, the government asks for a human
resources plan, providing details of farm recruitment activities for
Canadians in the relevant season including methods used to hire
local workers or students. 67 The wages for the requested worker
must be specified on the LMO form and are designed to illustrate
that any wages offered by the employer are consistent with
68
prevailing local wages in similar agricultural commodity work.
The other basic purpose of the LMO form is to ensure that the
housing and working conditions offered meet minimal provincial
employment standards. 69 Information on seasonal housing
approval is requested, along with documented proof of seasonal
housing inspection; if that is not available, the form requires
information on the previous year's inspection along with a current
housing inspection as soon as possible. 70 Regarding working
conditions, the LMO form requests information on whether the
position is part of a union. 7 1 If the worker is to be represented by
a union, specific information must be provided on the relevant
union local, including any consultations with the union along with
the union's position on hiring a temporary foreign worker through
64. Emp. & Soc. Dev. Can., Labour Market Opinion Application (LMO) Agricultural
Stream-Labour Market Impact Assessment Application, ESDC EMP5519 (2018 12 001) E
(displaying the Labour Market Impact Assessment Application Agricultural Stream).
65. Id. at 4 (requesting a description of the duties of the job offered and language
requirements).
66. Id. at 7 (requesting employer to document recruitment efforts).
67. Id. (displaying a table for employer to list methods of recruitment).
68. Id. at 6 (requesting employer to document that wage range requested and the
local wages meet the regional minimum requirements).
69. Id. at 10 (stating that it is the employer's responsibility to comply with federalprovincial/territorial legislation and regulations in providing suitable accommodations).
70. Id. at 9 (describing when inspections should take place).
71. Id. at 6 (requesting information regarding association with unions).
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the SAWP. 72 Information is requested for any labour disputes in
progress at the farm where the SAWP worker will be employed. 73
Along with the LMO form, the employer must submit a
completed copy of the appropriate SAWP employment contract. 74
There are some differences among the employment contracts that
revolve mostly around allowed employer deductions to recover
worker transportation and housing costs. Each of the SAWP
employment contracts contains some basic provisions covering:
* Scope and period of employment;
* Lodging, meals, and rest periods;
* Payments and deductions of wages;
* Insurance for occupational and non-occupational
injury and disease;
* Maintenance of work records and statement of
earnings;
* Travel and reception arrangements;
* Obligations of the employer and worker; and
* Premature repatriation.75
To facilitate the administration of the Program, Canada has
signed a number of bilateral and multilateral agreements with
Mexico and the Commonwealth Caribbean.7 6 These international
agreements-or Memorandums of Understandings-contain
basic provisions and protections for SAWP workers while in
72. Id. (requesting employer to document whether position is a part of a union); see
MINISTER OF PUB. WORKS & Gov. SERVICES CAN., HOW TO HIRE A TEMPORARY FOREIGN
WORKER (TFW): A GUIDEBOOK FOR EMPLOYERS 17 (2006), http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/p
df/pub/tfw-guide.pdf (explaining while HRSDC does not expect union concurrence, it does
expect documentation proving that the employer informed the union that the position will
be filled by a foreign worker).
73. Labour Market Opinion Application (LMO)Agricultural Stream-Labour Market
Impact Assessment Application, supra note 64, at 3.
74. Id. at 10-11 (describing the employer responsibility of providing a copy of the
employer contract).
75. See Contract for the Employment in Canada of Seasonal Agricultural Workers
from Mexico - 2019, EMP'T & Soc. DEV. CAN., https://www.canada.ca/en/employmentsocial-developmenttservices/foreign-workers/agricultural/seasonal-agricutural/apply/me
xico.html (last modified Dec. 18, 2018) (listing the provisions of the employment contract).
76. See Jenna L. Hennebry, Globalization and the Mexican-Canadian Agricultural
Worker Program: Power, Racialization & Transnationalism in Temporary Migration
(2006) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Western Ontario) (explaining that SAWP
is governed by a bilateral agreement with Mexico and Canada and was modeled after the
bilateral agreement with the Caribbean).
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Canada. 77 The Canada-Mexico SAWP operates according to a
"bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) originally
signed in 1974, which outlines the operational guidelines and
responsibilities" of each party in the Program.7 8 The agreement
makes it the responsibility of Mexico and Caribbean
Commonwealth countries to "assist" in the "recruitment,
selection, and documentation of bona-fide agricultural workers,"
"maintaining a pool of workers who are ready to depart to Canada
when requests are received from Canadian employers, and
79
appointing agents at their embassies/consulates in Canada."
Officials from source countries are also tasked with assisting
Canadian government officials in the "administration of the
program, and to serve as a contact point" for SAWP workers
80
regarding any work-related complaints.
Despite the importance of the agricultural sector to the
Canadian economy, it is difficult for SAWP workers to apply for
permanent residence (or landed immigrant) status. Unlike other
temporary foreign occupations that are considered high-skilled,
SAWP workers have no dedicated stream of permanent
immigration. Canada's immigration system selects economic
immigrants based on job offers from Canadian employers and
considers qualities such as education, Canadian work experience,
and official language abilities. 8 1 These considerations make it
extremely difficult for any SAWP workers to apply for landed
immigrant status. Statistics issued from the period 2005-2009
show that only two percent of SAWP workers in Canada
successfully transitioned to permanent residency, most of them
applying through the Family Class program (after having left

77. See Karla Valenzuela, Protection of Nationals Abroad: The Mexican State and
SeasonalAgricultural Workers in Canada,4 MEX. L. REV. 309, 312-13 (2011) (stating that
the Memorandum of Understanding contains guidelines and responsibilities for employers
and employees).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 313.
80. Id.
81.

See

Points-Based Immigration Systems:

Canada, LIBRARY

OF

CONG.,

https://www.loc.gov/law/help/points-based-immigration/canada.php (last updated June 9,
2015) (listing changes made to the points system considerations to include language,
education, and Canadian work experience).
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Canada).82
SAWP workers may only remain in Canada for a minimum of
six weeks to a maximum of eight months per year between
January 1 and December 15, and they may return in subsequent
years subject to the same entry and exit restrictions.8 3 The
recruitment process on the Canadian side specifies certain
minimal requirements, including experience in farming and being
84
over the age of eighteen.
However, workers in the SAWP are selected by Mexico and
participating Caribbean countries, which generally require
participants to have dependents in order to take part in the
Program.8 5 This recruiting preference also results in a workforce
that is more willing to work more hours. It is a strong incentive
for SAWP workers to maintain their employment and
remittances sent home and to recognize the precariousness of
their position in Canada.
A.

The United States H-2A Visa Program

From 1942-1964, the United States acquired a large amount
of Mexican farm labour through the Bracero Program.8 6 Although
Mexican farm laborers had long been working on American farms,
the Bracero Program is generally acknowledged as the first

82. Transition from Temporary Foreign Workers to Permanent Residents, STAT.
CAN.: BLOG, https://www.statcan.gc.ca/englblog/cs/transition-to-permanent (last modified
Sept. 28, 2017).
83. Guest Worker Programs:Canada,supra note 59 (stating that "employers can hire
TFWs from participating countries for a maximum duration of 8 months, between January
1 and December 15, provided they are able to offer the workers a minimum of 240 hours
of work within a period of 6 weeks," and that a "worker must go back to his home country
before he can apply for another work permit").
84. Hire a Temporary Worker Through the SeasonalAgricultural Worker ProgramApply for a Labour Market Impact Assessment, supra note 63.
85. See Kerry L. Preibisch, Local Produce,Foreign Labour, 72 RURAL SOC. 418, 435
(2007) (stating that "SAWP workers enter the country as single applicants, although they
must prove they have dependents in order to qualify for the program").
86.. See Vernon
M. Briggs Jr.,
Backgrounder: Guestworker Programs:
Lessons from the Pastand Warnings for the Future, CTR. IMMIGR. STUD. (Mar. 2004), htt
ps://www.cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2004/back304.pdf
(stating that the Bracero
Program's "biggest year was in 1959 when 439,000 braceros were employed").
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"major" American temporary foreign farm worker program.8 7 It
was meant to address the perceived problem of a surge of
undocumented Mexican migrant workers entering the United
States in the 1930s and early 1940s and worked in conjunction
with the mass round-ups of undocumented Mexican migrant
workers in the early 1950s. 8 8 Many scholars have emphasized the
needs of the American agricultural sector as the prime motivation
behind the Bracero Program, with lax enforcement of minimum
wages and employment and housing conditions responsible for
the relative expansion of the Program in the 1950s.8 9 The Bracero
Program was officially ended in 1964.90
Security
Department of Homeland
The American
summarized the Bracero Program as a "success" in "expanding
the farm labor supply" but attributes its demise to "depressed
wages" for farm workers in the Southwestern United States. 91 In
reality, there were many more problems with the Bracero
Program, including substandard housing conditions, dangerous
employment conditions, and continuous lawsuits related to

87. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FACT SHEET: H-2A TEMPORARY
AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROGRAM, HOMELAND SEC. DIG. LIBRARY 483694, https://www.
hsdl.org/?view&did=483694 (last modified Feb. 6, 2008) (describing the Bracero Program
as the first major temporary worker program); see generally Peter N. Kirstein, ANGLO
OVER BRACERO: A HISTORY OF THE MEXICAN WORKER IN THE UNITED STATES FROM
ROOSEVELT TO NIXON (1977) (explaining that the Program was named for the Spanish
term bracero derived from the term brazo or "arm" and that Bracero translates into "one
who works with his arms").
88. See generally Kelly Lytle Hernandez, The Crimes and Consequences of Illegal
Immigration:A Cross-BorderExamination of Operation Wetback, 1943 to 1954, W. HIST.
Q, 421, 423, 424, 429 (2006) (describing the creation of the Bracero Program and the
importation and subsequent deportation of Mexican temporary laborers).
89. See generally KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE: THE BRACERO PROGRAM,
IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. 42 (John Brigham & Christine B. Harrington eds., 1992)
(describing how the lax enforcement of the Program linked directly to the
demands of growers); see also Braceros: History, Compensation, RURAL MIGRATION NEWS
= 1
112 (describing how the
(Apr. 2006), https://migration.ucdavis.edulrmn/more.php?id
U.S. Department of Labor intentionally lowered the regulation standards for Bracero
housing, wages, and food to make it easier for growers to hire and accommodate legal
Mexican farm workers).
90. Uneasy Neighbors: A Brief History of Mexican-U.S. Migration, HARV. MAG.
(May-June 2007), https:/fharvardmagazine.com/2007/05/uneasy-neighbors-a-brief-html.
91. FACT SHEET: H-2A TEMPORARY AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROGRAM, supra note
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deductions of worker wages that were never repaid. 9 2 In 2008,
former Bracero workers reached a settlement agreement with the
Mexican government over unpaid wages and a fund was set up to
93
pay class members a cash settlement.
The problems with the Bracero Program and the continuing
entry of undocumented Mexican workers spurred the growth of
the agricultural union movement. 94 In particular, the ending of
the Bracero Program has been noted as the beginning of the
modern problems surrounding undocumented Mexican labor
migration to the United States. "The problem of Mexican illegal
immigration is born at the moment that the Bracero Program
ends. [Mexicans] keep coming, because the demand [for labor] is
still there." 95 The increasing number of undocumented Mexican
migrant farm laborers in the United States led unions to focus
their attention on advancing collective bargaining rights for
American citizens employed in the agricultural industry. 96
In 1964, the H-2 Visa Program replaced the Bracero Program,
allowing American employers to hire foreign workers "for both
agricultural and non-agricultural jobs in locations with a

92. See Kristi L. Morgan, Evaluating Guest Worker Programs in the U.S.: A
Comparison of the Bracero Programand President Bush's Proposed Immigration Reform
Plan, 15 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 125, 131 (2004) (describing how the problems with the
Bracero Program resulted in terrible working and living conditions); see also Otey M.
Scruggs, Texas and the Bracero Program, 1942-1947, 32 PAC. HIST. REV. 251, 261 (1963)
(describing how the Braceros had to accept painfully low wages and miserable living
conditions); see also CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES,

supra note 2 (describing how efforts to recover the Braceros' unpaid wages have resulted
in several lawsuits totaling hundreds of millions of dollars).
93. See N.D. Cal., If You Worked in the Bracero ProgramBetween 1942 and 1946, or
If You Are the Surviving Spouse or Child of Such a Bracero, and You Are
Living in the United States, You Could Get an Award from a Class Action Settlement,
https://www.ufw.org/pdf/EnglishClassNotice.pdf (last visited Aug. 9, 2018) (explaining
that as a result of the settlement, the Braceros Relief Fund was established, which offered
class members a one-time payment of 38,000 pesos).
94. Elaine Y. Chang, Senior Research Seminar Paper, Social Workers and the
Bracero Program: Working Within Migration Discourse and Conflicting Policy, U. CAL.
BERKELEY C. NAT. RES. (2010), https://nature.berkeley.edu/classes/es196/projects/2010fi
nal/ChangE_2010.pdf.
95. Uneasy Neighbors: A Brief History of Mexican-U.S. Migration, supra note 90
(quoting Jorge Dominguez).
96. See generally Chang, supra note 94 (describing how the Bracero movement
facilitated the discussion that would later lead to American workers seeking bargaining
rights in the civil rights movement).
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shortage of domestic workers." 97 Although some legal gains were
made by guest workers through the H-2 Program, many of the
problems faced by Bracero workers continued and the Program
itself became the subject of wider immigration reforms enacted
during the 1980s. 98 In 1986, the Immigration Reform and Control
Act (IRCA)99 was enacted, distinguishing between H-2 workers
into foreign temporary/seasonal agricultural workers (the H-2A
visa) and foreign temporary non-agricultural workers (the H-2B
visa). 100 A so-called amnesty provision in the IRCA allowed
certain undocumented workers to legalize their status in the U.S.,
provided that they could prove they worked for ninety days on an
American farm from May 1, 1985 to April 30, 1986.101 Nearly
three million undocumented Mexican farm workers in the U.S.
obtained permanent residency status under the amnesty
program.1 0 2 The Department of Homeland Security's statement
on the H-2A Visa Program echoes the general Canadian
government statements on the SAWP:
Employers in the United States have often faced a
shortage of available domestic workers who are able,
willing and qualified to fill seasonal agricultural jobs.
The H-2A program was instituted to meet this need for
adding
seasonal and temporary labor, without
10 3
permanent residents to the population.

97. FACT SHEET: H-2A TEMPORARY AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROGRAM, supra note

87.
98. See Ragini Tripathi, The H-2B Visa: Is This How We Treat a Guest?, 11 ST.
MARY'S L. REV. 519, 527-28 (2009) (describing how Bracero protesters laid the foundation
for future generations and started a movement that eventually forced Congress to enact
wider immigration reforms).
99. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359
(1986) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1101).
100.

FACT SHEET: H-2A TEMPORARY AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROGRAM, supra note

87.
101. See id. (explaining that the IRCA also provided for additional "replenishment
agricultural workers to enter the United States as temporary residents between 1990 and
1993 if there was a shortage of farm workers during that time').
102. Leah Haus, Openings in the Wall: TransnationalMigrants,Labor Unions, and
U.S. Immigration Policy, 49 INT'L ORG. 285, 288 (1995).
103. FACT SHEET: H-2A TEMPORARY AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROGRAM, supra note
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The Immigration and Nationality Act 10 4 authorizes the
establishment of the H-2A visa and outlines entrance procedures.
Three federal agencies manage the H-2A Program:
* The Department of Labor (DOL) issues the H-2A labor
certifications and oversees compliance with labor
laws.
* U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)
adjudicates the H-2A petitions.
* The Department of State (DOS) issues the visas to the
05
workers at consulates overseas. 1
The Department of Homeland Security oversees any security
issues related to the admittance of foreign migrant workers. 106
Nationals of a broad range of countries may apply for an H-2A
visa. 10 7 There is no current limit on the number of foreign
agricultural workers admitted under the H-2A Visa Program. 108
Similar to the Canadian SAWP protocol, there is a process
whereby employers must (1) verify that no U.S. citizens or
permanent residents are available to perform the required work,

104. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. ch. 12), § 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (demonstrating that this section
authorizes the H-2A Visa Program).
105. FACT SHEET: H-2A TEMPORARY AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROGRAM, supra note
87.
106. Randall Monger, Nonimmigrant Admissions to the United States:
2012, U.S. DEVT OF HOMELAND SEC., OFF. OF IMMIGR. STAT. (Aug. 2013), https://www.d
hs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/oisni fr 2012.pdf.
107. H-2A Temporary Agricultural Workers, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERV.'S, https://web.archive.org/web/20110121101553/http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/us
cis/template.PRINT/menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextchannel=88
9f0b89284a321OVgnVCMlOOOOOb92ca6aRCRD&vgnextoid=889f0b89284a321OVgnVC
M100000b92ca60aRCRD (last updated Jan. 14, 2011) (explaining that "effective January
18, 2011, nationals from the following countries are eligible to participate in the H-2A and
H-2B Programs: Argentina, Australia, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile,
Costa Rica, Croatia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Kiribati, Latvia,
Lithuania, Macedonia, Mexico, Moldova, Nauru, The Netherlands, Nicaragua, New
Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Samoa,
Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, South Korea, Tonga, Turkey,
Tuvalu, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, and Vanuatu. Of these countries, the
following were designated for the first time this year: Barbados, Estonia, Fiji, Hungary,
Kiribati, Latvia, Macedonia, Nauru, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Slovenia, Solomon
Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, and Vanuatu'D.
108. FACT SHEET: H-2A TEMPORARY AGRICULTURAL WORKER PROGRAM, supra note
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and (2) certify that the proposed wages and employment
conditions satisfy the applicable state employment standards and
do not result in depressed wages for American agricultural
workers performing similar labor. 10 9 Entrance under the H-2A
visa is generally authorized for less than one year, but the visa
may be extended for "qualifying employment" in increments of
110 A
less than one year, up to a maximum stay of three years.
foreign seasonal worker who has been in the United States on an
H-2A visa for three years is required to leave the United States
and remain outside U.S. territory for a consecutive three-month
1
period before seeking readmission under an H-2A visa. "
H-2A workers can, under certain conditions, apply for
permanent residency in the United States through the familybased immigration stream of the Immigration and Nationality
Act. 1 12 This requires an H-2A worker to have close relatives who
13
are U.S. citizens or U.S. permanent residents.1 These relatives
would file an immigration petition for an H-2A worker to attain
11 4
It
permanent residency immigration status and a Green Card.
is also theoretically possible for an H-2A worker to attain a Green
him or her-but in practice,
Card by having an employer sponsor
15
difficult."
quite
be
this would
Several aspects of the H-2A Program have been criticized.
The Program has been condemned as "deeply flawed" and giving

109. Id.; H-2A Temporary Agricultural Workers, supra note 107; Kerry L. Preibisch,
Local Produce, Foreign Labor: Labor Mobility Programs and Global Trade
Competitiveness in Canada,72 RURAL SOC. 418, 431 (2007).
110. H-2A Temporary Agricultural Workers, supra note 107.
111. Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(h)(5)(viii)(C) (2011) (explaining that an individual
having H-2A status for three years must remain outside the country for three
uninterrupted months before being granted H-2A status again).
112. Immigration and Nationality Act, supra note 104; see Family-Based
Immigrant Visas, TRAVEL. STATE.GOV, https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/us-visas/i
mmigrate/family-immigration/family-based-immigrant-visas.html (last visited Aug. 10,
2018) (explaining that some visas are available based on the presence of a family member
in the United States).
113. 8 U.S.C. § 1151 (explaining that close relatives are defined by the INAto include
parents, children, and spouses).
114. Family-BasedImmigrant Visas, supra note 112.
115. See Alana Semuels, For U.S. Farmers and Mexican Workers, It's Tough Being
Legal, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-guest-worker20130331-dte-htmlstory.html# (explaining that employers say that the H-2A Program is
broken and complicated and the process is a headache of applications and paperwork).
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"too much control to employers" when compared to Canada's
SAWP with respect to worker selection and placement.1 1 6 Under
the Program, which has been noted to amount to "slavery" and
"government bondage," workers pay high fees for
visas, job
placement, and poor quality housing and food.'1 7 The Program
allegedly stimulates the development of the recruitment and
contracting industry through unregulated private recruiters who
frequently mislead workers about job opportunities and benefits
and charge exorbitant job placement fees.1 18 Workers do not
receive adequate medical care for injuries and illness, and they
are threatened out of consulting with legal service providers or
talking to activists who try to inform the workers of their
rights. 1 9
Similar to the SAWP, the H-2A Program has grown
exponentially. The number of workers in the United States on an
H-2A visa increased from 6,445 in 1992, to approximately 64,404
in 2008, and to over 134,000 in 2016.120 Unlike the SAWP, the
U.S. Department of Homeland Security does not have any specific
obligation to ensure that H-2A workers return to their home

116. Bjorn Jensen, Labor Mobility and the Global Economy: Should the World Trade
OrganizationSet MigrationPolicy? 21, AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM. (July 10, 2006).
117. CLOSE TO SLAVERY: GUESTWORKER PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra
note 2.
118. See id. at 11 (describing how recruiters lied to workers about pay and amounts
of work and in some cases charged workers $10,000 in fees).
119. See id. at 29 (describing how employers took the passports of workers, denied
them medical care, and threatened complainers with deportation).
120. See ANDORRA BRUNO, IMMIGRATION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS RELATED TO
GUEST WORKER PROGRAMS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32044 (2006), available at
trac.syr.edu/immigrationlibrary/P333.pdf
(noting the
1992 increase
in H-2A
visas issued from 6,445 to 30,201); Multi-Year Graphs,TRAVEL.STATE.GOV, https://web.a
64 6
rchive.org/web/20100602191
/http://travel.state.gov/visa/statistics/graphs/graphs-439
9.html (last visited Aug. 16, 2018) (showing the level of H-2A visas issued had risen to
64,404 in 2008); Philip Martin, The H-2A Farm Guestworker Program Is Expanding
Rapidly: Here Are the Numbers You Need to Know, ECON. POL'Y INST.: WORKING ECON.
BLOG (Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.epi.orgfblog/h-2a-farm-guestworker-program-expandi
ng-rapidly/ (explaining that the number of H-2A visas issued in 2016 was over 134,000).
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countries. 12 1 The removal of overstaying H-2A workers would be
similar to any other process for removing aliens who overstay
their visas in the United States. However, American legislation
prohibits any H-2A worker who overstays his or her visa from
returning to the United States on another H-2A visa for a
minimum five-year period. 122 The Immigration and Nationality
Act states that an alien illegally in the United States for a period
of more than six months is prohibited from returning to the
country for a three-year period.1 23 Reliable statistics on overstay
rates for those workers issued H-2A visas are difficult to obtain,
and the American government is currently studying a number of
options to implement a comprehensive computerized visa exit
tracking system. 24 One 2004 study of Mexican workers receiving
H-2A visas at the U.S. Consulate in Monterrey, Mexico, found
that approximately forty percent of the workers issued H-2A visas
at that location subsequently overstayed their time in the United
121. Compare Changes to Requirements Affecting H- 2A Nonimmigrants, 73 Fed.
Reg. 30, 8230 (proposed Feb. 13, 2008) (to be codified at 8 C.R.F. pts. 214, 215, 274a)
(describing a possible change in U.S. policy in consideration of the current lack of exit
monitoring for nonimmigrants that involves adding a monitored exit through a designated
port of entry), with Tanya Basok, Canada's Temporary Migration Program:
A Model Despite Flaws, MIGRATION INFO. SOURCE (Nov. 2007), https://www.migrationpol
(describing
icy.org/article/canadas-temporary-migration-program-model-despite-flaws
how Canadian policy requires nonimmigrant workers to check in at a recruitment agency
in their home country upon completion of their work in Canada).
122. FED'N AM. IMMIGR. REFORM, Backgrounder: H-2A Agricultural Guest
Worker Program, availableat https://web.archive.org/web/20160327050737/http://www.fa
irus.org/DocServerlh2a.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2018); see also H2 Visas, U.S.
CONSULATE GEN. U.S., MONTERREY, MEX. (Mar. 6, 2016), https://web.archive.org/web/20
160316194605/http://monterrey.usconsulate.gov:80/work visa.html (explaining how H-2A
workers must return their entry visa forms (1-94 forms) at the border when returning to
Mexico once their work time has ended as proof that they have not overstayed their work
period in the United States).
123. See Immigration and Nationality Act, supra note 104, § 212(a)(9)(B) (noting
that aliens who overstay for over a year are prohibited from entering the United States
for a ten-year period).
124. See Daniel Costa & Jennifer Rosenbaum, Temporary Foreign Workers
by the Numbers: New Estimates by Visa Classification, ECON. POL'Y INST. (Mar. 7, 2017),
https://www.epi.org/publication/temporary-foreign-workers-by-the-numbers-new-estimat
es-by-visa-classification/ (explaining that the U.S. government is the main source of
information on nonimmigrants and the data collected is generally of poor quality and
recorded inconsistently across federal agencies); see generally Homeland Security To Have
Immigrant Exit Tracking System Ready Within 'Weeks, CBS DC (Mar. 6, 2012),
https://washington.cbslocal.com/2012/03/06/homeland-security-to-have-immigrant-exittracking- system-ready-within-weeks/ (describing how the U.S. is considering adding a
biometric system to track immigrants when they leave).
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States. 125
There have been no Canadian government studies on
overstay rates relating to SAWP workers. The structure of the
SAWP- requiring workers to have dependent family members in
their home countries-appears to have limited illegal overstays
or attempts by SAWP workers to gain permanent residency
through marriage. 126 The World Bank has conducted studies
showing the overstay rates to be relatively small at 1.5%.127 This
"negligible" figure, at current SAWP recruitment rates, would
represent about 400 to 500 SAWP workers overstaying their visa
128
in Canada.
B.

Canadian Unionization Campaigns and SAWP Workers:
Manitoba and Quebec

The United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) took on
the task of unionizing Canada's SAWP workers. The UFCW's
general position was that no worker in Canada-regardless of his
or her nationality or status-should be denied basic collective

125. See generally H-2A, H-2B, RURAL MIGRATION NEWS (Apr. 2006),
https://migration.ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id=1111
(explaining how the Mexican
Consulate in Monterrey began to require a sample of Mexican workers receiving H-2A
visas at that location to report for interviews within a month of the expiration of their
visas; from that sample, an approximate number of Mexican workers overstaying H-2A
visas was extrapolated).
126. See Janet McLaughlin & Jenna Hennebry, Pathways to Precarity:Structural
Vulnerabilities and Lived Consequences in the Everyday Lives of Migrant
Farmworkers in Canada7, INT'L MIGRATION RES. CTR.: WILFRID LAURIER UNIV., http://
www.yorku.ca/rapsl/events/pdf/McLaughlin-Hennebry.pdf (last visited Sept. 5, 2018)
(explaining that the screening process for SAWP workers has, in part, resulted in the vast
majority of SAWP workers returning home following their contracts); see also Kerry L.
Preibisch, Local Produce, Foreign Labor: Labor Mobility Programs and Global Trade
Competitiveness in Canada, 72 RURAL SOC. 418, 435 (2007) (showing how SAWP's
requirement for workers to have dependents is intended to deter SAWP participants from
seeking residency through marriage or from staying in Canada illegally).
127. Basok, supranote 121.
128. See id. (explaining that SAWP overstays are negligible at a rate of 1.5%); see
also Rosa Marchitelli, Migrant Worker Program Called 'Worse than Slavery'After Injured
Participants Sent Home Without Treatment, CBC NEWS (May 16, 2016),
https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/jamaican-farm-worker-sent-home-in-a-casket- 1.3577643
(noting that 30,000 farm workers come to Canada annually through the Seasonal
Agricultural Workers Program, and when multiplied by the SAWP overstay rate, it
reflects approximately 450 people who overstay as part of SAWP).
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bargaining rights. 129 The UFCW's national campaign to unionize
agricultural workers took form in two provinces that had long
participated in the SAWP: Manitoba and Quebec. Later efforts
would be concentrated in British Columbia while some provinces,
such as Alberta, saw no unionizing activity at all due to the
continuing existence of restrictive provincial laws regarding
agricultural workers and unionization. The following sections
examine and analyse unionization efforts of SAWP workers in
these provinces.
Manitoba was an early site for union organizing efforts on
farms. From 1999 to 2011 the province had an NDP majority
government heavily supported by trade unions. 130 Premier Gary
Doer's labour reforms early in his first term made it easier for
unions to obtain certification, generating some measure of
opposition from Manitoba's business community. 13 1 Doer may
have been able to blunt opposition to unionization by the
agricultural industry in Manitoba because his agricultural
132
policies were seen in a favorable light by many farmers.
Manitoba was also active in addressing problems with the
Temporary Foreign Worker Program. In 2007, the province
announced consultations aimed at regulating the unscrupulous
and abuses
behaviour of temporary foreign worker recruiters
133
associated with recruiting foreign workers.
The first unionization efforts involving SAWP workers in

129. Manoj Dias-Abey, Justice on Our Fields: Can "Alt-Labor" Organizations
Improve Migrant Farm Workers' Conditions?, 53 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 167, 185 (2018).
130. NDP Delegates Prepare for Fall Election, UNITED FOOD & COM. WORKERS:
LOCAL 832 (Apr. 12, 2011), http://www.ufcw832.com/node/745; Nelson Wiseman, Draft
Paper, The NDP: Manitoba'sNatural Governing Party? 11-12, UNIV. TORONTO (Sept.
2008), http://umanitoba.ca/faculties/arts/departments/political-studies/media/wiseman-p
aper.pdf.
131. David Kuxhaus, PremierTries to PlacateBusiness Riled by ContentiousLabour
Law Changes, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Aug. 2, 2000, at Al (noting that Doer's government
raised the minimum wage by almost fifty percent in nine years, generating more business
opposition).
132. See Valerie Lawton, Farmers Get $170 Million More in Aid, TORONTO STAR,
Nov. 5, 1999, at A5; Brian Laghi & David Roberts, One-Time Cash Payout to Help Prairie
Farmers with Spring Crop, GLOBE & MAIL, Feb. 25, 2000, at A4; Mia Rabson & Leah
Jenzen, Border Reopens to Live Cattle, WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Dec. 30, 2004, at Al.
133. News Release, Gov. Man., Province Announces Consultations to Better
Regulate Immigration Recruiters and Modelling Agencies (Nov. 21, 2007), https://news.g
62
.
ov.mb.ca/news/index.html?item=26
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Canada occurred in 2006 at Mayfair Farms in Portage La Prairie,
Manitoba. UFCW Canada Local 832 applied to represent the
bargaining unit in September 2006 but legal challenges by the
employer delayed the certification vote until June 2008, when
ninety-three percent of those who voted were in favor of a
collective agreement. 134 The campaign was marred by claims from
some of the Mexican SAWP workers alleging that they had been
misled by the UFCW into signing union cards. 135 These fortythree Mexican workers were represented by legal counsel who
alleged that the UFCW tricked the workers into signing union
cards by promising legal representation to three of their
coworkers in a criminal matter.1 3 6 The UFCW denied this stating
that the workers may have been coerced into making the
7
claims.13
In its negotiations with Mayfair Farms the UFCW was also
constricted by the farm's "fiscal realities" and the reality that the
process could not "put farmers out of business." 138 Wages were
just one issue for the union in the collective agreement
negotiations. For SAWP workers, the issues of seniority, as well
as a grievance procedure that protects temporary foreign workers
who complain of workplace conditions from being arbitrarily
repatriated, were of major importance, particularly given the
powers of the employer in the SAWP. 139 The farm signed a threeyear contract with UFCW Local 832 that was groundbreaking, as
it was the first successful attempt to create a bargaining unit

134. Ratification of UFCW CanadaFirst-Contractat Manitoba Farm Historic
Breakthrough for Migrant Workers, UNITED FOOD & COM. WORKERS CAN. (June 23,
2008), http://www.ufcw.ca/index.phpoption=com-content&view=article&id=587&catid=
5&Itemid=99&lang-en.
135. Mexican Migrant Workers Say They Were Misled into Signing Union
Cards, CBC NEWS (Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/montreal/story/2007/0
1/31/migrant-workers.html.
136. Id. (stating that the forty-three workers who signed statements "accused the
UFCW of telling them the union would provide them with a lawyer for three of their
coworkers, who were arrested in connection with a sexual assault and the assault of a
police officer while the workers were off duty").
137. Id.
138. Agricultural Workers in B.C. Join UFCW, UNITED FOOD & COM. WORKERS:
LOCAL 832 (Aug. 8, 2008), http://www.ufcw832.com/node/558.
139. Id.
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140
including SAWP workers.
However, in August 2009, the workers at Mayfair farms voted
their union. 141 Prior to the vote, the Mexican consul
decertify
to
had visited migrant Mexican farm workers at the farm and
allegedly warned them in a closed-door meeting that they could
be prevented from ever coming to Canada again if they did not
vote to decertify their union. 142 Workers were allegedly
threatened with exclusion from the SAWP based on their support
of unionization and "at least one strong union supporter [was]
denied return to Mayfair Farms" in 2009.143 Although the
UFCW's unionization campaign in Manitoba continues, recent
building alliances with
union efforts seem to be directed towards
1 44
groups.
advocacy
local migrant worker
In Quebec, the situation is complicated by the province's
unique control over immigration. Under the Canada-Quebec
Accord, the federal and Quebec governments share jurisdiction
with regards to immigration. 1 45 Section 1 of the Accord sets out
its broad objectives. 146 This includes the selection of persons
intending to reside and/or work permanently or temporarily in
Quebec. 14 7 In addition to federal entry requirements, the consent
of Quebec's government must be obtained prior to the entry of any
SAWP worker. 148 A Quebec "Acceptance Certificate" valid for one

140. Historic Ratification for Migrant Farm Workers, UNITED FOOD & COM.
WORKERS: LOCAL 832 (June 20, 2008), http://www.ufcw832.com/node/542.
141. Ed White, Unionized Farm Workers Choose to Decertify, W. PRODUCER (Aug.
13, 2009), https://www.producer.com/2009/08/unionized-farm-workers-choose-todecertify.
142. Jennifer deGroot, How Clean Are Your Carrots?,WINNIPEG FREE PRESS, Aug.
14, 2009, atA3.
143. Id.
144. See Local 832 Builds Bonds with Migrant Workers, UNITED FOOD & COM.
WORKERS CAN. (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.ufcw.ca/index.php?option=com_content&view
=article&id=2334:local-832-builds-bonds-with-migrant-workers&Itemid=6&lang-en.
145. Canada-Quebec Accord Relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission
of Aliens (Feb. 5, 1991), https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corp
orate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/agreements/federalprovincial-territorialquebec/canada-quebec-accord-relating-immigration-temporaryadmission-aliens.html; Margaret Young, Immigration: The Canada-QuebecAccord, BP252E (Mar. 1991), http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection-R[LoPBdP/BP/bp252e.htm.
146. Young, supranote 145.
147. Id.
148. Canada-Qu6bec Accord, supra note 145.
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season must be issued to MICC prior to arrival of any SAWP
workers in the province. 149 Under Jean Charest's Liberal
government, which came into power 2003, the province had been
ambivalent towards the UFCW's initial attempts at unionizing
SAWP workers at Quebec farms. 150 The neo-liberal, more agribusiness-friendly attitude of the Quebec Liberal Party under
Charest mirrored to some extent the approach previously taken
by the Harris government in Ontario. In particular, the Charest
government's ambitious "Ring6nierie de l'Etat" (Reengineering
of the State) involved curtailing the power of Quebec's labour
unions through reducing the number of bargaining units in the
public health sector and abolishing the unions formed by domestic
care workers as first steps towards more drastic changes in
15
industrial relations. '
As in Ontario, the UFCW and agricultural employers in
Quebec became engaged in a legal battle that included union
complaints to the Quebec Labour Relations Board (QLRB). A
complaint to the QLRB culminated in a recent decision that
dramatically altered the situation for SAWP workers in the
province; the decision effectively nullified a law that prevented
the unionization of mainly migrant farm workers and granted a
certification application for a unit of six Mexican migrant
workers. 1 52 In Travailleurset travailleuses unis de l'alimentation
et du commerce, Section locale 501 v. Johanne L'Ecuyer & Pierre
Locas, 153 the Quebec Labour Relations Board struck down Section
21, Paragraph 5, of the Qu6bec Labour Code, which stated,
"Persons employed in the operation of a farm shall not be deemed
to be employee ... unless at least three of such persons are
ordinarily and continuously so employed." This section of the code
effectively prevented migrant farm workers from unionizing by
requiring a minimum of three workers in the proposed unit to be

149. Id.
150. Michel Coutu & Julie Bourgault, Freedom of Association in Qudbec Since BC
Health Services: The New Quiet Revolution?, 16 CAN. LABOUR & EMP'T L.J. 135 (2011).
151. See id. at 138 (noting that "well over half a million workers are directly affected
by these challenges").
152. Travailleurs et travailleuses unis de l'alimentation et du commerce, Section
locale 501 v. Johanne L'tcuyer & Pierre Locas, 2010 QCCRT 0191 (Can.) [hereinafter
Travailleurs].
153. Id. paras. 2-3.
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"continuously" employed at the farm. 154
The Quebec government intervened in part to stress the
15 5
differences among the migrant workers' status in Quebec.
Quebec argued that Mexican farm workers in the province under
the SAWP faced a different set of circumstances with respect to
employment conditions when compared to Guatemalan farm
workers in the province under the low-skilled stream of the TFW
Program. 156 While information on both groups was included as
part of the Travailleurs complaint, and the Quebec government
essentially argued that the QLRB should ignore information
presented on behalf of TFWP workers when applying the Charter
to SAWP workers.1 57 The QLRB rejected this argument, noting
that many sources of information can "permettent de tisser la
s'inscrivent les questions
toile de fond sur laquelle
constitutionnelles d6battues par les parties" ["help to weave the
background fabric on which to view the constitutional questions
discussed by the parties"]. 1 5 8 Finally, Quebec argued that if the
labour code provision was found unconstitutional, the appropriate
remedy would be for the Quebec legislature to design new labour
code provisions for migrant farm workers-however, these new
provisions did not necessarily have to incorporate a certain model
1 59
of union certification.
The QLRB held that the Quebec Labour Code provision
violated the Charter by effectively preventing union
representation for the largely temporary foreign migrant farm
workers in the province, stating that Section 2(d) of the Charter
guarantees the right to engage in collective bargaining, not just a
theoretical right to join an association. 60 The QLRB specifically
noted the circumstances of SAWP workers on Quebec farms,
whose vulnerability and discriminatory treatment were
prohibited under the Charter.
Le statut de travailleurs agricoles migrants constituerait

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

para. 33.
paras. 38, 46.
para. 39.
paras. 46-56.
para. 59.
paras. 402-03.
para. 341.
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un autre motif de discrimination prohib6e par la Charte
canadienne. Cette exclusion du r6gime g6n6ral
d'accr6ditation pr6vu au Code constituerait un
d6savantage et une distinction ayant pour effet de
d6valoriser et marginaliser davantage des travailleurs
particuli6rement
vuln6rables.
Cette
vuln6rabilit6
d6coule de leur condition de travailleur agricole migrant
n'ayant aucun statut l6gal en tant que citoyen ou
r6sident permanent du Canada.
[The status of migrant farm workers constitutes another
ground of discrimination prohibited by the Charter. This
exclusion from the system of certification under the Code
would be a disadvantage and a distinction that has the
effect of devaluing and marginalizing workers who are
more particularly vulnerable. This vulnerability stems
from their status as migrant farm worker with no legal
status as citizen or permanent resident of Canada.] 16 1
The Travailleursdecision also contains large sections devoted
to analysing the SAWP work contract, wages of Mexican and
Caribbean workers in the province, and such workers' mobility
and employment restrictions. 162 The QLRB noted that the Code
provision affected a significant number of workers, approximately
6,000 SAWP and other temporary foreign agricultural workers
from non-SAWP participating countries in Quebec each year. 163
In striking down Section 21, Paragraph 5, of the Quebec Labour
Code, the QLRB determined that it must apply the labour code as
if the impugned provisions did not exist. 164
The QLRB granted a certification application for a unit of six
Mexican migrant workers. 16 5 It refused the province's requests to
delay implementation of the decision or allow time for drafting of
new legislation on the following basis: (1) there had already been
a twenty-month delay in certification, and (2) the Board could not
presume that the province's intentions in applying for judicial
review or in amending the Labour Code would include extending

161. Id. para. 24.
162. Id. paras. 135-78.
163. Id. para. 107; Union Victory for Quebec Farm Workers, NAT'L UNION PUB. &
GEN. EMP.'S (Apr. 22, 2010), https://nupge.ca/contentunion-victory-quebec-farm-workers.

164. Travailleurs,supra note 152, paras. 408-10.
165. Id. para. 405.
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some type of coverage to seasonal migrant workers. 166 The QLRB
was also critical of the farm industry's arguments that it was
economically, uniquely fragile, noting that there was insufficient
evidence to prove that the agricultural industry in Quebec was on
the brink of economic failure. More specifically, the QLRB stated
that there is no plausible link between the stated objective of
protecting family farms and the denial of unionization to seasonal
workers, pointing out that recognizing the right of farm workers
to engage in collective bargaining is a prerequisite to industrial
167
democracy.
The QLRB's consideration of SAWP workers in Quebec
resulted in a positive outcome for the UFCW and for SAWP
workers seeking to unionize.1 68 This outcome was reached by
adopting an approach that considered the historical context of
SAWP workers in Canada, the nature of farm work, and the goals
of workplace equality in a democracy. Significantly, it
acknowledged the marginal position of the complainants and
rejected arguments that rights can be abrogated to protect certain
economic interests. The QLRB's ruling potentially opened the
door for eventual legal recognition of labour unions in Quebec
comprised of a majority of SAWP workers or temporary foreign
workers for designated employers. More recently, an agricultural
unit at Produit VegKiss farms outside of Montreal, composed
largely of Mexican SAWP workers and Guatemalans in the lowerskilled stream of the TFWP, was certified in Quebec in December
2011.169

However, the QLRB did not guarantee SAWP workers the
right to participate in the Wagner model of collective bargaining.
It left open the possibility that an alternative model of collective
bargaining could be enacted for Quebec farms, similar to the

166. Id. paras. 411-412.

167. Id. para. 302.
168. UFCW Canada Union Victory for Quebec Farm Workers, UNITED FOOD
& COM. WORKERS CAN. (Apr. 26, 2010), http://www.ufcw.ca/index.php?option=com-conte

nt&view=article&id=1803.
169. Seventh Agriculture Unit Certified in Quebec, UNITED FOOD & COM.
=
WORKERS CAN., http://www.ufcw.ca/index.php?option=com-content&%20view article%2
O&id=2600% 3Aseventh agriculture-unitcertifiedin quebec&catid=6%3Adirectins-news
letter&Itemid=6&lang-en (last visited Jan. 24, 2018).
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AEPA in Ontario. 170 The legal process was also quite long, and as
of April 2012, it was still ridden with legal uncertainty. The
Travailleurs decision came nearly two years after workers at the
Mirabel-area farm voted for certification. Perhaps most
importantly, the QLRB's decision was issued one year before the
Supreme Court of Canada's Fraser decision. A good deal of the
QLRB's reasoning was based on Judge Winkler's Ontario Court
of Appeal ruling in Fraser-muchof which was later overturned
171
by the Supreme Court.
Alberta remains the province with the most comprehensive
exclusions with respect to agricultural workers and collective
bargaining. There has been very little UFCW activity in Alberta,
despite the fact that the province is host to a small number of
SAWP workers. In 2010, the total number of Mexican SAWP
workers in Alberta was approximately 850, representing a 3%
decline from the previous year and accounting for approximately
5% of the total number of Mexican SAWP workers in Canada. 172
The composition of SAWP workers in Alberta is almost
exclusively Mexican and includes a majority of "name hires" (i.e.,
workers specifically requested by name), with slightly more than
ten percent of cases refused as name hires. 173 The 15 complaints
involving SAWP workers in Alberta in 2010 included 1 worker
"sent home due to performance issues, 3 due to poor health, and
3 due to personal issues."'17 4 The average SAWP worker's
experience in Alberta is characterized by seasonal returns to
Canada for a period of 6 years, with 118 Alberta farms using
SAWP workers in 2010.175
The province has made it easier for skilled temporary
workers, entering the province through the federal Temporary
Foreign Worker Program, to apply for permanent residency. In
2011, the Alberta government announced that skilled temporary

170. Travailleurs,supra note 152, paras. 342-343, 401, 411.
171. See generally id. (frequently referencing the Canadian Supreme Court case
Ontario v. Fraser, the opinion of which was delivered by Judge Winkler).
172. ALTA. BEEKEEPERS COMM'N, Record of Service Canada Meeting to Discuss
SAWP with Alberta Employers (Oct. 27, 2010).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
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foreign workers that are certified in Alberta's thirty-one optional
trades can apply directly to the province-as opposed to going
through their employers-for permanent residency. 176 This
residency option is not applicable to SAWP workers or workers
177
entering the TFW Program through the low-skilled stream.
SAWP workers are reliant on their federal employment
contract protections since Alberta farm workers remain excluded
from many legislative protections in the workplace. 178 A voluntary
workers' compensation scheme for farm owners forces injured
farm workers to resort to litigation, a route that SAWP workers
are unlikely to pursue due to unfamiliarity with Canada's legal
179
systems and for fear of being blacklisted.
Provisions in the Alberta Employment Code regarding
minimum wages, wages relating to overtime and statutory
holidays, and hours of work do not apply to temporary foreign
agricultural workers; even some provisions restricting the
employment of children do not apply to the workers.1 80 The
exemptions are similar to those in other provinces (Ontario,
Saskatchewan, and Prince Edward Island), targeting farm
workers "whose work is directly related to the primary production
of eggs, milk, grain, seeds, fruit, vegetables, honey, livestock,
18 1
game-production animals, poultry, bees[,] or cultured fish."
Workers on Alberta farms and ranches are also exempted from
collective bargaining provisions in the Alberta Labour Relations
Code if they are involved in these activities "or any other primary
agricultural operation specified in the regulations under the

176. News Release, Gov't Alta., Temporary Foreign Workers Certified in Alberta
Trades Can Apply for Permanent Residence (Mar. 14, 2011), https://www.alberta.ca/relea
Gov't
also
see
se.cfm?xID=30062B4E87190-D7CB-48ED-F675A738194FDDE4;
Alta., List of Compulsory and Optional Certification Trades (Oct. 20, 2018), https://trade
secrets.alberta.ca/SOURCES/PDFS/designatedtrades certification.pdf; Alberta Foreign
Workers Can Apply to Government for Permanent Residency, EDMONTON J. (Mar. 14,
2011).

177. News Release, Gov't Alta., supra note 176.
178. Bob Barnetson, The Regulatory Exclusion of Agricultural Workers in Alberta,
14 JUST LAB.: CAN. J. WORK & SOC. 50, 50 (2009).

179. Id. at 53-54.
180. Alberta Employment Standards Code, R.S.A. 2000, c E-9, pt. 1, § 2(3)(4).
181. Barnetson, supranote 178, at 53.
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Employment Standards Code." 18 2 Alberta's legislative exclusion
is broader than Quebec's exclusion before the latter was struck
down in 2010.183 Following Fraser,it is unclear if a constitutional
challenge to Alberta's legislation would produce the same
outcome as in Quebec. What is clear is that SAWP workers
remain completely excluded from collective bargaining in Alberta
for the foreseeable future.
C. Union Organizingand H-2A Workers
While unionization efforts by H-2A workers bear many
similarities to those efforts employed by their Canadian
counterparts, they also reflect important differences. The United
Farm Workers often used full-time organizers to spread
information regarding collective bargaining, mirroring efforts by
other American unions in the industrial sector. 184 Since the NLRA
formed the basis of legal regulation for collective bargaining in
the private sector, American labor unions increasingly criticized
the exclusion of agricultural labor from the NLRA while targeting
farm workers for unionization.1 8 5 Individual farm labor contracts
tended to undermine the protection of exclusive representation as
well as the legal enforcement of employers' obligation to bargain
86
with farm workers.1
The Bracero Program, centered on unrepresented foreign
workers entering into individual contracts, represented another
challenge, as unions also saw it as an obstacle to their efforts to
improve working conditions and wages for local farm workers.' 8 7

182. Alberta Labour Relations Code, supra note 13, c L-1, § 4(2)(e)(i)(ii) (an
amendment made by SA 2017, c 9, enacted on June, 7, 2017, came into force retroactively
on May 4, 2017).
183. Barnetson, supra note 178, at 53.
184. See generally William B. Gould, Taft-Hartley Revisited: The Contrariety of the
Collective BargainingAgreement and the Plight of the Unorganized, 13 LAB. L.J. 348
(1962) (providing an overview of the difficulties and potential pitfalls of utilizing paid
union organizers in collective bargaining campaigns).
185. Agricultural Labor Relations - The Other Farm Problem, 14 STAN. L. REV. 120,
142-49 (1961).
186. See J. I. Case Co. v. N.L.R.B., 321 U.S. 332, 332 (1944) (holding that individual
employment contracts outside of a collective bargaining scheme could serve as an obstacle
to organization and permit an employer to "divide and conquer").
187. SuSAN FERRIS & RICARDO SANDOVAL, THE FIGHTIN THE FIELDS: CESAR CHAVEZ
AND THE FARMWORKERS MOVEMENT 56-60 (Diana Hembree ed., 1997).
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Many of the justifications for using Braceros on American farms
mirrored the racist stereotypes of Mexican and Caribbean
workers seen in Canada, outlined above in article 2.188 The key
differences in the American responses to this situation stem from
several factors. Discrimination in America is deeply rooted in the
legacy of slavery and has been addressed openly in American
society. This has prompted a much more robust federal legal
response through instruments such as the Civil Rights Act of
1964.189 Public-interest labor law is a highly-developed field of
litigation in the U.S., with the most litigated area in this field
being employment discrimination. 90 The Civil Rights Act also
established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
which prohibits discrimination in employment based on race,
color, sex, national origin, or religion. 191 Furthermore, the post1945 period witnessed the general engagement of American
unions with agricultural workers on a scale not seen in Canada
at least until the 1990s or into the new millennium. Much of this
was due to charismatic and influential labor leadership in the
agricultural sector, at the forefront of which was Cesar Chavez.
Chavez was a giant in the American farm labor union
movement and a full examination of the man and his work would
far exceed the ambit of this article.1 92 For purposes of this paper,
though, Chavez's significance lies in his background coming from
a family of Mexican migrant farm workers; his signature
accomplishment was his founding, with Dolores Huerta, of the
National Farm Workers Association, which later became United
Farm Workers Union.1 93 Born to Mexican migrants in Yuma,

188. Id. at 109.
189. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, enacted July 2, 1964
(outlawing racial discrimination throughout the United States, including major forms of
discrimination in the workplace).
190. Gould IV, supra note 18, at 187.
191. Civil Rights Act of 1964, supra note 189, § 703(b).
192. See Ferris & Sandoval, supra note 187 (providing a fuller appreciation of
Chavez's effect on the American Labor movement).
193. See Cesar Chavez, HISTORY.COM, https://www.history.comtopics/mexico/
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Arizona, Chavez's influence began in1950 in San Jose, California,
with own personal involvement as a Mexican-American farm
worker enduring often brutal and low-wage employment. 194 His
subsequent efforts involved decades of community organizing and
interacting with the political and legal systems. 19 5 His actions
involved forming alliances with other immigrant groups besides
Mexicans working on American farms and, in particular, the
Filipino farm worker community. 196 Chavez's work, and the
American farm labor movement, hit a critical point in early 1966,
culminating in a historic march of California grape pickers for
higher wages; workers marched almost 400 kilometers from the
small farming town of Delano to the state capitol in
Sacramento. 197 The striking farm workers earned the support of
several influential U.S. politicians, including then Senator Robert
F. Kennedy.19 8 Organizing movements sprang up across the
Southwestern and Midwestern United States. 199
It was through many efforts similar to these that by the
1960s, a critical mass of workers led by effective labor leadership
had brought the issue to the forefront of politics in several large
U.S. states. During this period a considerable number of
cesar-chavez (last updated Aug. 21, 2018) (explaining that the United Farm Workers
Association was renamed United Farmworkers Union, or UFW, after joining with AFLCIO); Inga Kim, The Rise of the UFW, UNITED FARM WORKERS (Apr. 3, 2017),
https://ufw.org/the-rise-of-the-ufw/-(explaining that Cesar Chavez was the son of
extremely poor farm workers and later founded the National Farm Workers Association
with the help of cofounder Dolores Huerta).
194. See Cesar Chavez, HISTORY.COM, supra note 193 (explaining that Cesar Chavez
was born in Yuma, Arizona, to immigrant parents); see also Cesar Chavez, Huelga: Tales
of the Delano Revolution The Organizer'sTale, RAMPARTS MAG., July 1966 (explaining that
Cesar Chavez's experience began in 1950, sixteen years before 1966).
195. Id.
196. When Mexicans and Filipinos Joined Together, UNITED FARM WORKERS,
https://ufw.org/research/history/mexicans-filipinos-joined-together/ (last visited Sept. 16,
2018).
197. See generally KATHLEEN KRULL & YUYI MORALES, HARVESTING HOPE: THE
STORY OF CESAR CHAVEZ (2003) (explaining that the march from Delano to the state capitol
in Sacramento was more than three hundred miles).
198. RFKand Cesar Chavez, PBS: AM. EXPERIENCE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh
amex/rfk/peopleevents/p chavez.html (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
199. See generally Wendy Jepson, Spaces of Labor Activism, Mexican-American
Women and the Farm Worker Movement in South Texas Since 1966, 37 ANTIPODE 679
(2005); Mark Erenburg, Obreros Unidos in Wisconsin, 91 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 17 (1968);
About FLOC, FARM LABOR ORG. Comm., http://www.floc.com/wordpress/about-floc/ (last
visited Jan. 12, 2019).
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American unions had joined forces to urge the U.S. government
to dissolve the Bracero Program and, moreover, attempt to divide
the "alliance between ranchers" and "government bureaucrats"
that ran the Bracero Program. 20 0 Bracero was essentially a
system of temporary contract labor that viewed Mexican farm
workers as unable to contribute to American society outside of the
harvest season. 20 1 Chavez echoed the general arguments of U.S.
organized labor and was deeply opposed to the Bracero Program,
not only because of the Program's racist, economically
exploitative elements and often degrading treatment of migrants,
but also on the grounds that the Program hurt domestic American
farm workers by keeping farm labor wages low and hindering the
formation of unionized farm labor through the availability of
cheap, non-resident migrant farm labor. 20 2 This position was in
line with the general historical position of most American unions
that largely excluded
prior to the twentieth century, a position
20 3
activities.
organizing
from
migrants
new
In 1972, Chavez went on a hunger strike in an attempt to stop
Arizona from passing a bill that would ban farm workers from
striking during the harvest season-a move that would effectively
gut the power of their union. 20 4 Although his hunger strike was
unsuccessful in stopping the anti-union legislation, it brought the
plight of non-unionized farm workers to the widespread attention
of Americans. 20 5 By the 1980s, with free trade negotiations and
international labor issues becoming more prominent political
issues, American unions had shifted their position to supporting
migration of foreign workers to the United States "when such
measures [helped to] facilitate organization of foreign-born

200. Ferris & Sandoval, supra note 187, at 54, 65, 70.
201. See Marjorie S. Zatz, Using and Abusing Mexican Farm Workers: The Bracero
Programand the INS, 27 L. & SOC'Y & Soc. REV. 851 (1993).
202. Ferris & Sandoval, supra note 187; see also KITTY CALAVITA, INSIDE THE STATE:
THE BRACERO PROGRAM, IMMIGRATION, AND THE I.N.S. (1992).
203. GWENDOLYN MINK, OLD LABOR AND. NEW IMMIGRANTS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL
DEVELOPMENT: UNION, PARTY, AND STATE, 1875-1920 165-66 (1986).

204. History of Si Se Puede!, UNITED FARM WORKERS, https://ufw.org/research/
history/history-si-se-puede/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2018).
205. Id.
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workers. '20 6 The efforts to unionize farm workers also led unions
to adopt a more "inclusive approach" to organizing H-2A workers
20 7
in the 1990s.
D.

Collective Bargainingand H-2A Workers: R.J. Reynolds Case
Study

The UFW created its "Guest Worker Program" in 2006 in
response to H-2A workers' inability to obtain union
representation in the United States. 20 8 The UFW's traditional
approach had been to advocate for eliminating the H-2A Program
due to its "highly exploitative nature."209 The UFW's criticisms of
the H-2A Program and unionization of H-2A workers mirrors that
of the UFCW in Canada. The UFW alleges that H-2A workers in
the United States have faced blacklisting and intimidation
whenever discussions of union representation have arisen. 210 Like
the UFCW in Canada, the UFW has worked with foreign
governments on migrant farm worker issues; one example
includes signing an agreement with the government of the
Mexican state of Michoacdn to "ensure the integrity of H-2A
recruitment" for Mexican H-2A workers in the U.S.211
The UFW campaign resulted in a collective bargaining
agreement including H-2A workers being signed with Growers
Labor Services (GLS), a federally licensed farm worker
contractor. 212 The agreement provided for "seniority rights for
workers; a binding issues resolution process; wages above the
federally required minimum; and minor medical coverage for nonwork related injuries or illnesses and discharges only in the case
206. Leah L. Haus, Openings in the Wall: TransnationalMigrants, Labor Unions,
and U.S. Immigration Policy, 49 INT'L ORG. 285, 293 (1995); see generally GARY WOLFE
MARKS, UNIONS IN POLITICS: BRITAIN, GERMANY, AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE
NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURIES (1989) (providing a comparison of

organizing techniques for skilled and unskilled workers in the United States).
207. Haus, supra note 206 ("Unions may seek to organize these [foreign] workers to
advance the interests of American workers. Absent organization, foreign-born workers
may undercut unionized American workers.").
208. UFW Guest Worker Program, UNITED FARM WORKERS (July 29, 2008),
https://ufw.org/UFW-Guest-Worker-Program/.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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of just cause. ' 213 The GLS collective agreement also includes "all
rules and regulations related to the H-2A program" in order to
facilitate direct enforcement of H-2A provisions "without
depending on State or Federal agencies." 2 14 This provision
addresses the problems American state and federal officials face
with enforcement of both H-2A regulations and labor
legislation. 2 15 The UFW has thus moved away from advocating
abolishment of the H-2A temporary farm worker Program to a
model of reform and collective organization for temporary foreign
farm workers. It has also increased its advocacy work for 21H-2A
6
workers in communicating with state and federal agencies.
However, the first collective bargaining agreement in the
United States to include H-2A workers was signed prior to the
GLS agreement and involved the Farm Labor Organizing
Committee (FLOC), a farm workers' advocacy group founded in
the mid-1960s and inspired by many of the goals that motivated
Chavez and the UFW. 21 7 The FLOC is primarily active in the
Midwest and North Carolina. 21 8 It was in North Carolina in the
late 1990s that the FLOC became engaged with H-2A workers
complaining of poor wages and working conditions at a pickle
company called Mt. Olive. 21 9 The FLOC "organized a 5-year
boycott and won a collective bargaining agreement with both Mt.
Olive and the North Carolina growers association in 2004."220 The
FLOC described the win as "historic" not only "because it was the
first ever collective bargaining agreement for agriculture workers
in the South, and the first in the history of the H2A program," but

213. Id.
214. Id.
215. See id.(ensuring that workers' rights are protected through a union contract in
order to develop a just program that is both fair to workers and meets the needs of U.S.
farmers).
216. Id.
217. See Jen Soriano, FLOC: Winning Collective Bargaining for Farm Workers,
GRASSROOTS GLOB. JUST. ALL. (July 14, 2011), http://ggjalliance.org/node/796 (stating that

FLOC was founded in the mid-1960s by Baldemar Veldsquez, a tomato farm worker in
Northwest Ohio, "who started out by convincing a small group of migrant farmworkers to
come together for their collective good").
218. See id. (stating that FLOC has thousands of members in the Midwest and North
Carolina).
219. Id.
220. Id.
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also because it opened the door for FLOC organizers to target
other North Carolina growing operations for H-2A worker
unionization. 22 1 The tobacco industry was selected, primarily
because of the continuing significance of tobacco in the North
Carolina economy even in the face of declining tobacco farming.22 2
The FLOC focused its collective bargaining efforts on R.J.
Reynolds American, the largest tobacco company in the United
States, as well as the largest non-unionized tobacco company in
the U.S. and a major user of H-2A workers. 223 In September 2007,
the FLOC launched a letter-writing campaign, followed by
attendance at shareholders meetings, thereby pressuring lenders
in an attempt to force the company to negotiate a contract
including H-2A workers and domestic farms workers at Reynolds'
2 24
tobacco farms in North Carolina.
R.J. Reynolds responded to the allegations with an open letter
addressed to "[t]hose interested in farm labor issues." 22 5 The
letter complained of inappropriate efforts to "pressure" Reynolds
into negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement for H-2A
workers:
What may not be clear to many who have contacted R.J.
Reynolds, urging the company to negotiate with the
union, is that FLOC has had a collective bargaining
agreement with the N.C. Growers Association (NCGA)
for the last four years. All guest H2A workers who are
interested in union representation have been and
continue to be free to sign up for membership with
FLOC. Neither RAI nor R.J. Reynolds is the appropriate
party to negotiate any collective bargaining agreement

221.
222.

Id.
See

TOM

CAPEHART,

TRENDS

IN

U.S.

TOBACCO

FARMING,

ERS, TBS-

257-02 (Nov. 2004), www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/39463/48597 tbs25702.pdf?v
=42087 (noting that twenty-nine percent of farms that grew tobacco were in North
Carolina, but by 2002, that number had fallen to fourteen percent).
223. See Soriano, supra note 217 (recognizing that the FLOC also targeted R.J.
Reynolds because of its "long history of using racism and red-baiting to destroy union
efforts').
224. Id.
225. Press Release, Bd. of Dir.'s & Leadership Team of Reynolds Am. Inc., An Open
Letter to Those Interested in Farm Labor Issues (Jan. 16, 2019) (later revised
and titled: An Open Letter From the Board of Directors and Leadership Team of Reynold
s American Inc.).
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with FLOC. As the sponsoring organization for the H2A
workers, the NCGA is the appropriate body 2to26 negotiate
such an agreement - and they have done so.
The Company claimed that employed H-2A workers were not
"employees" of R.J. Reynolds and therefore any collective
bargaining arrangement would have to be made with the
sponsoring agency, the North Carolina Growers Association:
Many of the farmers R.J. Reynolds contracts with employ
workers to assist them in growing and harvesting the
tobacco. Workers are employed by those farmers; they
are not employees of either R.J. Reynolds or RAI; so
neither company is an appropriate or necessary party to
a collective bargaining agreement for farm workers. If
farm workers want to be represented by a union, the
workers and their employer should negotiate with the
union - not RAI or R.J. Reynolds. The North Carolina
Growers Association has a collective bargaining
agreement with FLOC, and the farms with whom R.J.
Reynolds contracts are free to join the association and
participate in the collective bargaining agreement if they
so choose. Many do, and thus, some of the workers on
R.J. Reynolds contracts are already
farms with whom
22 7
FLOC members.
Finally, Reynolds noted that the "real issue" appeared to be
getting new sources of revenue for the union, and in particular
accused FLOC of singling out Reynolds using deceptive tactics
and inaccurate information:
FLOC's actions against our companies to this point lead
us to believe that this is an issue of revenue for the union.
According to the N.C. Growers Association, FLOC
membership among H-2A workers has dropped from
4,000 to 640. FLOC's membership is plummeting;
workers may be cancelling their membership because
they are not receiving benefits they believe were
promised by the union. RAI and its operating companies
will not be party to efforts to pressure workers into
rejoining the union they have voluntarily left. FLOC has
been accused of using deceptive tactics to recruit

226. Id.
227. Id.
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membership. The Consulate of Mexico has contacted the
N.C. Growers Association regarding concerns they have
that FLOC is not delivering on its promises to members.
Approximately 800 workers have filed complaints about
FLOC with the Consulate.... It should be noted that
R.J. Reynolds is not the largest purchaser of tobacco in
North Carolina or any other state where tobacco is
grown. Yet R.J. Reynolds is the only tobacco company
being targeted for protests and boycotts by FLOC. . .The
issues surrounding migrant workers are national,
longstanding and involve the production of a number of
crops - but for unspecified reasons FLOC has singled out
tobacco, farms in North Carolina and R.J. Reynolds in
this matter. Reynolds American and R.J. Reynolds
support efforts to ensure that workers in all industries
have a safe work environment. Guest H-2A workers in
North Carolina who are interested in joining FLOC can
do so, and they would then be party to the collective
bargaining agreement already in place with the N.C.
Growers Association. Absolutely nothing prevents them
2 28
from doing so today.
FLOC offered a point-by-point rebuttal to Reynolds letter
repeating that it only asked for a meeting with company officials,
not negotiations. 229 The letter conceded that Reynolds does not
employ the workers but repeats that Reynolds "maintains
ultimate responsibility" as the contractor with growers who hire
the farm workers. 230 It objected to Reynolds' claim that the North
Carolina Grower's Association is responsible for any collective
bargaining negotiations with the UFW, claiming that according
to a "best guess ...merely 20% of their growers are members of
the NCGA." 231 FLOC denied organizing a boycott against
Reynolds, stating that it was targeting the tobacco industry in
general-not just Reynolds-as other tobacco companies would be
approached and Reynolds was merely the first because of its

228. Id.
229. See Press Release, Farm Lab. Org. Comm., FLOC Response to Reynolds' "Open
Letter to Those Interested in Farm Labor Issues" (2009) (addressing Reynolds' open letter
by presenting responses alongside individual points made by Reynolds).
230. See id. (arguing although Reynolds is not the employer, Reynolds controls the
work conditions of the tobacco farmers).
231. Id.
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dominant position in the industry. 232 Finally, FLOC noted that
Reynolds' "Corporate Social Responsibility" program included
many interviews and focus groups on workers' and employers'
issues, involving all stakeholders in the industry and the H-2A
Program-except for the farm workers themselves. 23 3 The dispute
between FLOC and Reynolds resulted in FLOC working with
Oxfam America and the United Church to present an assessment
of human rights conditions in tobacco fields to a Reynolds'
shareholders meeting on May 6, 2008.234 FLOC shareholders of
Reynolds attended the 2009 shareholders' meeting in an attempt
to press their concerns involving a number of issues including H23 5
2A worker conditions.
Despite the successes noted above, unionizing H-2A workers
in the United States remains difficult. In the last decade, there
has also been an exponential increase in the number of H-2A
applications filed by employers. While certified H-2A jobs are
usually greater than actual H-2A visas issued, they nevertheless
indicate the continued growth of the Program. In the first year of
the Obama Administration, fiscal year 2009, employers filed
8,150 labor certification applications requesting 103,955 H-2A
workers for temporary agricultural work. 236 The Department of
Labor certified 94% of the applications submitted for a total of
86,014 workers. 237 In 2017, during the first year of the Trump
Administration, employers filed 10,115 applications for a total of
200,049 certified positions. 238 Despite the increase in H-2A
applications, the proportion of unionized H-2A workers has
remained relatively steady. Even accounting for FLOC's

232.
American
233.
234.

See id. (noting that Reynolds has a stature globally, given that British
Tobacco owns 42.5% of Reynolds).
Id.
FLOC Goes to the 2008 Reynolds Tobacco ShareholdersMeeting, FARM LAB.

ORG. COMM. (2010).

235. See Reynolds Represses Shareholders, Refuses to Hear Farm Workers, FARM
LAB. ORG. COMM. (2010).

236. Rule for H-2A

Temporary Agricultural Worker Program Announced,

U.S. GREEN CARD LOTTERY NEWS (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.usadiversitylottery.com/ne

2
010.php.
ws/immigration/green-card-dv2012-immigration-news-mar5
237. Id.
238. EMP'T & TRAINING ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OFFICE OF FOREIGN LABOR

CERTIFICATION: H-2A TEMPORARY AGRICULTURAL LABOR CERTIFICATION PROGRAM SELECTED STATISTICS, FY 2017 (displaying data as of Sept. 30, 2017).
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organizing efforts in North Carolina, the amount of H-2A workers
unionized throughout the Midwest and South by FLOC remains
2 39
at 10,000 farm workers.
Most employers involved in the H-2A Program continue to
oppose the UFW organizing efforts. Legal counsel for H-2A
employers have recently warned agricultural employers that
The UFW is continuing its efforts to force H-2A workers
to join a union ....
Unions want to be the gatekeepers of
the H-2A program in their desperation to grow their
membership. The UFW's involvement with the
recruitment of H-2A workers from Mexico will impact
24 0
employers.
The UFW was also criticized for its agreement with the State
of Michoacdn:
In April 2008 the UFW signed an agreement with the
state of Michoac~n, Mexico to bring H-2A workers into
the US who would automatically join the UFW.
According to the UFW, their involvement with the H-2A
program will reduce corruption in the recruitment
workers and protect their rights in the US. It will also
conveniently provide the UFW with more members who
will have no choice in union membership.241
The advent of the FLOC in the 1960s in some ways mirrors
the efforts of the UFCW in Canada in the 2000s. Both
organizations attempted to address issues unique to migrant
farm workers, including legal issues resulting from alleged
abuses in the H-2A Program and SAWP. However, there are some
key differences between the two. FLOC was created as a bottomup or grassroots organization by a farm worker raised in a
Mexican migrant worker family. 242 The key strength of such an
organization is its ability to channel direct and practical concerns
239. David Flores, FLOC Launches Ambitious Plans in Tobacco Fields, LAB. NOTES
(July 1, 2014), http://labornotes.org/2014/07/floc-launches-ambitious-plans-tobacco-fields.
240. MC Saqui & AP Raimondo, The UFW's Continuing Efforts to Recruit H-2A
Workers ('It is critical that employers carefully examine the labor contractors they intend
to work with and to consult with qualified immigration and labor counsel as they put
together their H-2A programs.').
241. Id.
242. Ren6 Perez Rosenbaum, Farm Labor Organizing Committee (FLOC):
GrassrootsOrganizingfor the Empowerment of the Migrant Farm Worker Community, 13
CULTURE, AGRIC., FOOD & ENV'T 21, 21 (1993).
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on the ground into political power. 243 The FLOC was and has
remained keyed in to regional concerns in the Midwest and midAtlantic regions as exemplified by its persistent efforts against
R.J. Reynolds in North Carolina. 244 Although it became affiliated
with The American Federation of Labor and Congress of
Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), a national labor union, in
1992, it did so partly to "build relations" with international farm
workers groups; this effort is demonstrated by its opening of an
office in Monterrey, Mexico, to provide information and assist H2A workers in coming to the United States. 24 5 In comparison with
the FLOC, which has been in operation for over forty years, the
UFCW's organizing efforts on Canadian farms began in earnest
in the 1990s. 246 Although there were some earlier attempts at
organizing, efforts directed towards SAWP workers began in
earnest only after the Dunmore decision in 2002.247 The most
analogous grassroots organization in Canada directed towards
migrant farm workers would be the AWA. But the AWA is a farm
workers' advocacy group, not an actual union, and does not
248
generally engage in legal challenges.
V. COMPARATIVE CONCLUSION

The disparity between the number of total workers in the

243.

See LEE STAPLES, ROOTS TO POWER: A MANUAL FOR GRASSROOTS ORGANIZING 3

(1984) (reasoning that participating in the political process by voting as a group is a source
of power for grassroots organizations).
244. See FLOC Goes to the 2008 Reynolds Tobacco ShareholdersMeeting, supra note
234 (describing over 100 supporters rallied to meet with FLOC).
245. See The Early Years of FLOC, FARM LAB. ORG. COMM. (2010) (noting that the
AFL-CIO is a national American trade union center and the largest federation of unions
in the United States).
246. See History of Agricultural Workers in Canada, UNITED FOOD & COM.
WORKERS CAN., http://www.ufcw.ca/index.php?option=com-content&view=article&id=20

12:history-of-agricultural-workers-in-canada&catid=58&Itemid=5&lang-en (last visited
Jan. 25, 2018) (illustrating the timeline of UFCW's efforts with respect to agricultural
workers).
247. Id.
248. See UNITED FOOD & COM. WORKERS CAN., The Status of Migrant Farm
Workers in Canada 2010-2011 12 (2011), http://www.ufcw.ca/templates/ufcwcanada/imag
es/awa/publications/UFCW-Status ofMF Workers_2010-2011_EN.pdf (describing the
services as assisting workers with a number of issues such as repatriation intervention,
worker's compensation claims, parental leave benefits, CPP, QPP, employment insurance,
and health insurance claims).
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United States relative to Canada is clearly important in any
comparison between the countries. In the area of documented and
temporary foreign agricultural workers, the numbers narrow
somewhat as there are more than twice the number of H-2A visa
workers entering the U.S. in recent years compared to foreign
workers coming to Canada through the SAVTP. 249 However,
equally as important as the countries' differences in size is the
history of the countries' respective labor movements. It is a
critical consideration in this analysis.
Organizing migrant farm labor takes time, and time is a key
element in any comparative analysis between the United States
and Canada related to migrant farm labor and collective
bargaining. The comparatively recent legal engagement with
unionizing agricultural workers in Canada is clearly responsible
for much of the delay in efforts to unionize these workers. The
delays in resolving the issue through Canada's Supreme Court
are another problem. Canada's labour laws and legal labour
structure, along with the advent of the Charter in 1982 and
subsequent court challenges to violations of workers' Charter
rights, also played critical roles in the relatively later
development of a migrant farm labor consciousness in Canada.
The relative delay in Canadian legal activity is only one part
of the problem in unionizing SAWP workers. This article provided
a background of collective organizing efforts directed at farm
labor in the United States, and information from the U.S. H-2A
Program relating specifically to documented temporary
agricultural workers. A comparison to Canada's own context and
the SAWP demonstrates the historical use in both countries of
"unfree" populations to engage in farm labor and the difficulties
and resistance encountered in unionizing documented temporary
foreign agricultural workers.
America's labor law structure and its greater federal
involvement has led to the enactment of federal laws specifically
directed at protecting migrant workers' rights. The differing
levels of union activity between Canada and the U.S., coupled
249. See Juliana Vengoechea Barrios, Labor Trafficking in the Americas in Context:
A Look into the Guest Worker Program,8 MEX. Y.B. INT'L L. 639, 645-46 (2013) (stating
that roughly 30,000 workers enter the U.S. through the H-2A Program and 18,000 workers
enter Canada through the SAWP).
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with the fact that some states have allowed for farm labor
collective bargaining, has led to a greater level of unionization
activity in many U.S. states.
differences among
also illustrates
The comparison
jurisdictions within both countries. The largest U.S. state,
California-which has the largest migrant worker population and
is arguably the most relevant for Mexican H-2A workers-has
long offered extensive legislative protections and seen large-scale
250
civil rights and political protest related to migrant workers.
The largest Canadian province, Ontario-which has the largest
percentage of SAWP workers-continues to argue for limited
organizing rights for farm workers. 251 This state of affairs exists
while both Canada's Supreme Court and the federal government
largely ignore or understate the difficulties SAWP workers face
in Canada. Some other jurisdictions in the U.S. and Canada, such
as Alberta and many U.S. Southern states, are notable in their
similarity of banning agricultural unionization efforts. The
American legislative protections that address violations are
balanced out by employers' greater control in the H-2A Program
over recruitment and less government regulatior relating to the
Program itself.
Politically, there are some key differences as well. Federal
policies relating to H-2A workers under recent Democrat
administrations in the United States have relied less on the
support of Southern states in national elections, and therefore
may have fewer political reasons to fear pro-union reforms of the
H-2A Program. Recent federal Conservative governments in
Canada have garnered strong political support from the two
provinces most resistant to farm worker unionization: Alberta
and Ontario. However, the current federal Liberal government
has been more open to reforming some of the abuses associated

250. See Daniel Costa, California Leads the Way: A Look at California Laws that
Help Protect Labor Standards for Unauthorized Immigrant Workers 1, 7, ECON. POLY
INST. (Mar. 22, 2018) (analyzing laws passed in California for the protection of migrant
workers).
251.

See Canada:SAWP, RURAL MIGRATION NEWS (Apr. 2008), https://migration.

ucdavis.edu/rmnmore.php?id=1304 (stating that "workers employed in the Ontario
agricultural sector continue to be excluded from union organizing laws," and noting that
"Ontario also excludes farm workers from joining trade unions for the purpose of collective
bargaining").
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with the SAWP, although it has also been criticized for taking
2
little actual steps to improve the SAWP. 25
Both the U.S. and Canada share a racist past in aiming to
procure "suitable" temporary farm labor from the developing
world. Although the United States never explicitly rationalized
the H-2A Program as a form of aid to developing states, the
Program is defended by the American government as being in line
with the international labor goals of fair wages and equal
treatment of migrant workers. 25 3 But many U.S. states use the
term "development" in conjunction with the H-2A Program only
to refer to the development of their own employment sectors. 254
At least one can complement the honest use of the term. The use
of temporary populations with limited freedom to alleviate farm
labor shortages may allow a destination country to focus on its
own workforce development in other sectors. However, this
dispels the notion that the H-2A Program is in place to promote
economic development in Mexico. Similarly, the SAWP, viewed as
a "labor development" program or a form of development aid,
cannot redress the inequalities and labor disruptions caused by
economic globalization.
Some U.S. labor activists have argued that extending NLRA
coverage to include agricultural workers in the U.S. would be the
best avenue for addressing collective bargaining issues. 2 55 For a
variety of reasons, however, expanding the NLRA to include

252. See Edward Dunsworth, Predictingthe Future of Temporary Foreign Worker
Programs... In the 1960s and 70s, ACTIVEHISTORY.CA (Oct. 4, 2017), http://activehistory.
ca/2017/10/the-future-of-temporary-foreign-worker-programs (stating "while Trudeau and
the Liberals continue to issue platitudes around improving TFWPs and providing
pathways to permanent residency, very little has actually changed').
253. See News Release, United Farm Workers, Federal Court Rejects Agribusiness
Attack on Obama Administration Rules on Agricultural Guestworkers (Apr. 10, 2010),
https://ufw.org/FederalCourt-Rejects-Agribusiness-Attack-on-Obama-AdministrationRules-on-Agricultural-Guestworkers/ (stating that in January 2009, the Obama
administration issued regulations restoring wage, housing, transportation, and other
workplace regulations removed from the Program by the previous Bush administration);
InternationalLabor Standardson Migrant Workers, ILO, https://www.ilo.org/global/stan
dards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/migrant-workers/langen/index.htm (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).
254. H2A Process for Temporary Seasonal Agricultural Workers, IOWA
WORKFORCE DEV. (Oct. 8, 2014), https://web.archive.org/web/20141008223633/http://ww

w.iowaworkforce.org:80/centers/alc/h2a.htm.
255. Read, supra note 32, at 530.
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agricultural workers is not a practical option. First, the
"overwhelming political power" of the agricultural lobby makes it
difficult to imagine a successful Congressional vote in favor of the
proposition, at least for the foreseeable future. 256 Second, any
federal intrusion into this area has the potential to "undercut"
farm worker unionization gains made by American unions
through relatively progressive state labor legislation such as the
ALRA. 257 Many American labor lawyers familiar with the NLRA
complain that it offers inadequate protections to those workers
258
that it does cover.
Perhaps most significantly, the extension of increased legal
protections has failed to prevent widespread abuses within the H2A Program. In contrast to the Canadian SAWP experience, the
situation in the United States demonstrates that governmental
deregulation of the operation of a temporary foreign worker
program, even in the context of increased formal legal workplace
protections, results in more employer control. Less governmental
oversight results in increased obstacles for unionization and
increased potential for abuses of foreign workers' rights. 2 59 This
occurs even when the law is extended to provide nominal
protections for these workers. As this article has illustrated, the
practical benefits of American and Canadian law for H-2A and
SAWP workers are impeded by a variety of factors: the lack of
federal and/or provincial/state resources and influential corporate
and farming interests being two of the primary issues.
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